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OPPORTUNITY IN OHIO: RETHINKING
NORTHEAST OHIO’S OPPORTUNITY ZONES
WITH LOCAL LEGISLATION
PATRICK J. LIPAJ*
ABSTRACT
Welcome to Census Tract 1186.02! Here, in a small sliver of Cleveland’s Glenville
neighborhood, tucked between Superior and Hough Avenues, you will uncover a lot.
You will discover a rich history of the city’s ethnic and cultural roots. You will also
find gang violence, underperforming schools, a median household income of $9,526,
and a poverty rate of 66.5 percent. Something you will not find in 1186.02 is
investment. Private or public, money is not flowing in to 1186.02 and it has not for a
long time. The substantial toll of continuous underinvestment on the residents of this
neighborhood, one of Cleveland’s poorest, is palpable and the need for relief is clear.
This relief recently became possible when 1186.02 was designated as a Qualified
Opportunity Zone by the U.S. Treasury Department. This designation, made available
through the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, could be a watershed moment for
Glenville. By providing significant federal tax benefits to investors, Congress hopes
to encourage a massive inflow of investment into low-income communities, like
Glenville, that have long suffered from perennial underinvestment.
Unfortunately, the hope of relief for Tract 1186.02 and its residents will likely be
short-lived. Because the federal Opportunity Zone provision was written too broadly,
it not only permitted too many designations, but it also allowed for the designation of
numerous not-so-poor neighborhoods. In other words, the law pits communities that
need the investment most—like Glenville—against neighborhoods that are much
better-off—like Cleveland’s downtown core and trendy Tremont neighborhood. For
context, there are tracts in the city’s downtown core and Tremont neighborhood that
were designated with median household incomes that septuple (i.e. seven times as
much) those in 1186.02. The odds that areas like Glenville can outcompete such bettersituated areas for private investment dollars are slim-to-none. As a result, the residents
of 1186.02 will be left behind again.
But it does not have to be this way. It is not too late for the City of Cleveland and
Cuyahoga County to take advantage of the many positive aspects of the Opportunity
Zone provision, while ensuring that those benefits are directed towards their most-inneed neighborhoods. By enacting local legislation that targets these underdog tracts
for additional services and public investment, this Note argues Cleveland and
Cuyahoga County can level the playing field and provide neighborhoods like Glenville
and tracts like 1186.02 with the competitive advantages they need to rediscover their
potential.

* J.D., May 2020, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. I thank my parents—John and Annette
Lipaj—for being the most supportive and loving parents a kid could ask for. I am also deeply
grateful for all the time, effort, and feedback that Professor John Plecnik and the Cleveland State
Law Review team provided to improve this Note.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When the Great Recession ravaged the U.S. economy in 2008 and 2009, it spared
no class of Americans. Wealthy Americans lost $8 trillion in stock market value as
Wall Street tanked.1 Middle-class Americans saw approximately $9.8 trillion in
wealth disappear as their home values and retirement savings washed away.2 Poorer
Americans fell even further behind as poverty became more concentrated and job
opportunities dried up.3
A decade later, by late 2019, the American economy bounced back. Stock markets
more than recovered the value lost during the financial crisis, reaching record heights

1 Renae Merle, A Guide to the Financial Crisis — 10 Years Later, WASH. POST (Sept. 10,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/a-guide-to-the-financial-crisis-10-years-later/2018/09/10/114b76ba-af10-11e8-a20b5f4f84429666_story.html?utm_term=.3181b586cda1.
2 Id.
3 Elizabeth Kneebone & Natalie Holmes, U.S. Concentrated Poverty in the Wake of the Great
Recession,
THE
BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION
(Mar.
31,
2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/u-s-concentrated-poverty-in-the-wake-of-the-greatrecession/.
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in late 2019.4 Home values returned to pre-crash levels.5 Businesses—big and small—
experienced record profits,6 and unemployment dipped to a fifty-year low.7 Yet, for
the poorest Americans, recovery never arrived.
Then, in early 2020, economic calamity struck again. As this Note went to press,
the COVID-19 global pandemic was wreaking havoc on the U.S. economy and
throwing Americans out of employment at levels not seen since the Great Depression
in the 1930s.8 And, unfortunately for the poorest of Americans, the road to recovery
does not look any easier this time around.
The roadblock that withholds recovery from many of America’s poorest during
recessions is known as concentrated poverty. The term concentrated poverty refers to
“areas where a high proportion of residents are poor.”9 In extreme cases, where more
than forty percent (40%) of the population lives below the federal poverty line, social
scientists refer to these areas as “pockets of poverty.”10
Pockets of poverty are concerning for two reasons. First, pockets of poverty subject
their poor residents to “concentrated disadvantage—from higher crime rates and
poorer health outcomes to lower educational opportunities and weaker job
networks.”11 Research shows that children who grow up in neighborhoods with
concentrated disadvantage have less upward mobility than children who grow up

4 Chris Matthews, Nasdaq Ends Above 9,000 with 10th-Straight Record Close; S&P, Dow
Set
New
All-Time
Highs,
MARKETWATCH
(Dec.
26,
2019),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/nasdaq-ends-above-9000-with-10th-straight-recordclose-sp-dow-set-new-all-time-highs-2019-12-26.
5 Merle, supra note 1.
6 Record Level of Small Businesses Experiencing Profit Growth, NAT’L FED’N INDEP. BUS.
(May 8, 2018), https://www.nfib.com/content/press-release/economy/record-level-of-smallbusinesses-experiencing-profit-growth/.
7 Avie Schneider, U.S. Unemployment Rate Drops to 3.7 Percent, Lowest in Nearly 50 Years,
NPR (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/05/654417887/u-s-unemployment-ratedrops-to-3-7-percent-lowest-in-nearly-50-years.
8 Christopher Rugaber, US Unemployment Surges to a Depression-Era Level of 14.7%,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 8, 2020), https://apnews.com/908d7a004c316baceb916112c0a35ed0.
9 Isaac Shapiro, Cecile Murray, & Barbara Sard, Basic Facts on Concentrated Poverty,
CENTER
ON
BUDGET
AND
POLICY
PRIORITIES,
November
3,
2015,
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/11-3-15hous2.pdf.
10 See generally, e.g., Mark D. Partridge & Dan S. Rickman, Persistent Pockets of Extreme
American Poverty and Job Growth: Is There a Place-Based Policy Role?, 32(1) J. AGRIC. &
RESOURCE ECON. 201 (2007); Lisa Lambert, Pockets of Poverty Grow in the United States,
REUTERS (Nov. 3, 2011, 8:57 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cities-povertynewspro/pockets-of-poverty-grow-in-the-united-statesidUSTRE7A23NU20111103?feedType=RSS&feedName=everything&virtualBrandChannel=
11563.
11 Lambert, supra note 10.
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elsewhere.12 Second, analysis shows that pockets of poverty grew throughout the
United States in the years after the Great Recession, even as the rest of the economy
recovered.13 These two problems, when combined, suggest that a growing number of
Americans are deprived of upward mobility simply because of where they live.
Opportunity Zones seek to solve this problem. Through a bipartisan 14 provision in
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (“TCJA”),15 Opportunity Zones hope to tap the
economic recovery of the wealthy—an estimated $6.1 trillion in unrealized capital
gains16—and reinvest it in the countless low-income communities that still await
recovery. The Opportunity Zone provision attempts to achieve this end by rewarding
investors, real estate developers, and businesses with significant tax incentives when
they reinvest their capital gains in certain designated areas.
This Note centers on using Opportunity Zones as a means to the end of alleviating
highly concentrated poverty. With that focus in mind, this Note argues that
Opportunity Zones suffer from two key shortfalls. First, the TCJA was flawed because
it qualified too many zones yet simultaneously allowed for some of America’s poorest
tracts to remain undesignated. Second, the tax incentives provided by the TCJA will
not be enough, on their own, to effectively alleviate high concentrations of poverty.
Therefore, this Note ultimately concludes that additional legislation is needed at the
local level to ensure that Opportunity Zones reach their full potential. By exploring
past initiatives similar to Opportunity Zones, this Note recommends four ways that
local communities—like the City of Cleveland and Cuyahoga County—can maximize
poverty-alleviation within their Opportunity Zones: (1) limiting the number and scope
of eligible tracts, (2) tailoring local expenditures on services and infrastructure, (3)
simplifying local taxation and regulation, and (4) encouraging robust community
input.
This Note proceeds in four steps. Part II provides background on the growth of
highly concentrated poverty in the United States, explores the theoretical foundations
of Opportunity Zones, and analyzes the success of similar programs. Part III considers
how investors, real estate developers, and businesses can benefit from Opportunity
12 Raj Chetty & Nathaniel Hendren, The Impacts of Neighborhoods on Intergenerational
Mobility I: Childhood Exposure Effects, at 35 (2017) (“[C]hildren’s opportunities for economic
mobility are shaped by the neighborhoods in which they grow up. Neighborhoods affect
children’s long-term outcomes through childhood exposure effects: every extra year a child
spends growing up in an area where permanent residents’ incomes are higher increases his or
her income.”).
13 Kneebone & Holmes, supra note 3.
14 The Opportunity Zone proposal was hatched in a 2015 white paper by Jared Bernstein,
who was an economic adviser to Joe Biden when he was vice president, and Kevin Hassett, who
is now chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers for U.S. President Donald Trump. Jessie
Romero, Opportunity Zones, More Money More Problems? The Promise and Pitfalls of a New
Financing Model for Distressed Communities, ECON FOCUS, First Quarter, 2019, at 10.
15 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z (2018).
16 Jennifer Pryce, There's A $6 Trillion Opportunity In Opportunity Zones; Here's What We
Need
To
Do
To
Make
Good
On
It,
FORBES
(Aug.
14,
2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jenniferpryce/2018/08/14/theres-a-6-trillion-opportunity-inopportunity-zones-heres-what-we-need-to-do-to-make-good-on-it/#1addafaf6ffc.
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Zones. Part IV recommends legislative tools that local governments can use to
maximize the poverty-alleviating potential of their Opportunity Zones and proposes
legislation for Cleveland City Council and Cuyahoga County Council. Finally, Part V
briefly concludes.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Growth of Highly Concentrated Poverty in the United States
Despite its status as one of the wealthiest nations on earth,17 America has a poverty
problem. The problem is not just that it has one of the highest rates of poverty among
rich nations.18 The more concerning problem is that America’s poverty increasingly
concentrates in small areas. Describing recent shifts in America’s demographics,
researchers from the Brookings Institution noted, “rather than spread evenly, the poor
tend to cluster and concentrate in certain neighborhoods or groups of neighborhoods
within a community.”19 The concern that arises from clustering—discussed more in
the next section—is that businesses and investors avoid areas of concentrated poverty.
As a result, residents struggle to obtain nearby employment, poverty compounds, and
the likelihood that poor residents remain poor increases.20 In sum, a growing number
of Americans are trapped.21

1. Illustration: Market Failures
To solve the problem, it is important to understand how poverty concentrates in
the first place. Generally, businesses in a free market economy seek to maximize

17 John Harrington, Richest Countries in the World 2018: The Top 25 Wealthiest Nations,
USA TODAY (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/11/28/richestcountries-world-2018-top-25/38429481/ (ranking the United States the eleventh wealthiest
nation in the world by Gross National Income per capita).
18 Poverty Rate, OECD (2020), https://data.oecd.org/inequality/poverty-rate.htm.
19 ELIZABETH KNEEBONE & CAREY ANNE NADEAU, THE NEW AMERICAN SUBURB: POVERTY,
RACE AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 15 (Katrin B. Anacker ed., 2015).
20 Joe Cortright & Dillon Mahmoudi, Lost in Place: Why the Persistence and Spread of
Concentrated Poverty—Not Gentrification—is our Biggest Urban Challenge, CITY
OBSERVATORY, Dec. 2014, at 7 (“[Research] looking at millions of families and their children,
shows that intergenerational income mobility is significantly higher in metropolitan areas that
have lower levels of income segregation.”).
21 ALAN BERUBE ET AL., THE ENDURING CHALLENGE OF CONCENTRATED POVERTY IN
AMERICA: CASE STUDIES FROM COMMUNITIES ACROSS THE U.S. 11 (David Erickson et al. eds.,
2008),
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/1024_concentrated_poverty.pdf; see also Eva T. Van Kempen,
Poverty Pockets and Life Chances: On the Role of Place in Shaping Social Inequality, 41(3)
AM. BEHAV. SCI. 430, 445–47 (1997) (noting how the reduced access to the job market,
socialization, stigmatization, and limited access to social rights experienced by those living in
poverty pockets can affect their life chances).
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revenues and minimize costs.22 This often entails hiring workers that are the most
productive at the lowest cost (i.e. demanding the lowest wage).23 Put another way, if
worker A has the skills to produce ten widgets per hour and demands $10 per hour,
while worker B can only produce eight widgets per hour yet also demands $10 per
hour, a business will hire worker A because she is more productive.
In theory, the labor force of workers is mobile.24 That is, workers like A and B are
able to freely move from one job or area to another if they are not satisfied with their
current working conditions. But here is where theory does not match reality. Labor is
not freely mobile in areas with highly concentrated poverty. 25 As a result, the free
market fails to optimally allocate resources between areas and people, as demonstrated
below.
For example, when neighborhoods—like Cleveland’s Glenville—lack skilled
workers, businesses often locate their offices and plants distant from these areas,
preferring proximity to skilled workforces that can provide a higher return on their
investment.26 As such, residents living in pockets of poverty must make a tough
decision to stay employed: travel longer distances or move closer to the job. The first
option is limited to those who can travel longer distances. Research suggests that
access to cars and adequate public transportation is limited for low-income families.27
This is especially true for Glenville residents because Ohio notoriously underinvests
in public transportation, compared to other states.28 The second option, moving closer
22 MARTIN KOLMAR, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS: AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH 201–04
(Springer International Publishing, 1st ed., 2017) (explaining the basic assumption of revenue
maximization in free market economic theory and its link between cost functions).
23 Id.
24See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 99 (New York: Random House 1937) (“The whole of the advantages and
disadvantages of the different employments of labour and stock must, in the same
neighborhood, be either perfectly equal or continually tending to equality. If, in the same
neighbourhood, there was any employment evidently either more or less advantageous than the
rest, so many people would crowd into it in the one case, and so many would desert it in the
other, that its advantages would soon return to the level of the other employments. This at least
would be the case in a society where things were left to follow their natural course, where there
was perfect liberty, and where every man was perfectly free both to [choose] what occupation
he thought proper, and to change it as often as he thought proper.”); see also Simon Rottenberg,
On Choice in Labor Markets, 9 INDUS. & LAB. REV. 183 (1956).
25 Partridge & Rickman, supra note 10, at 203–04.
26 Id.
27 BERUBE ET AL., supra note 21, at 11 (“A large proportion of low-income households in
many metropolitan areas do not own private vehicles and also lack access to good public transit,
further isolating them from job opportunities.”); see also Partridge & Rickman, supra note 10,
at 204.
28 Wendy Patton & Victoria Jackson, How Ohio Funds Public Transit, POL. MATTERS OHIO
(May
26,
2017),
https://www.policymattersohio.org/research-policy/sustainablecommunities/transit/how-ohio-funds-public-transit (“Ohio spends less on public transit than 44
states . . . Ohio’s contribution of just $.63 per-capita is below that of rural South Dakota and
Maine, and ranks eighth lowest in the nation.”).
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to the job, is also limited. The lack of affordable housing in other parts of town29 and
a variety of other informational and discriminatory barriers all but eliminate the
possibility of moving.30 For many, the only option left is to stay in the pocket of
poverty without a job.31
When the middle class moves out, the situation only worsens. Without families
generating income, real estate values plummet and local schools deteriorate because
their primary funding source—property taxes—evaporates. This leaves pockets of
poverty with jobless parents and hopeless children who face an uphill battle due to
their concentrated disadvantage. Unable to obtain the skills or education necessary,
children born into highly concentrated poverty oftentimes remain through
adulthood.32 Then, the cycle repeats with the next generation.

2. Poverty, Data, and the Midwest
While recent analysis suggests that the problems of highly concentrated poverty
worsened in the United States after the Great Recession, 33 the problem appeared
especially profound in the post-industrial economies of the Midwest—cities like
Detroit, Cleveland, Toledo, and Indianapolis.34 In its assessment of the growth of
pockets of poverty, the Brookings Institution noted that the Midwest led the nation in
the growth of such pockets.35
And at the center of the Midwest’s problem is Northeast Ohio, where vast portions
of the population live in pockets of poverty.36 The numbers are staggering. In
Cleveland, 32% of residents live in neighborhoods where the median household
income is in the bottom quartile of American households.37 In East Cleveland, the

29 BERUBE ET AL., supra note 21, at 11 (“[T]he lack of affordable housing options in other
parts of the city-as well as racially segmented housing markets-can constrain the ability of lowincome families to move to lower-poverty neighborhoods, even when they express a desire to
relocate.”).
30 Raj Chetty et al., Creating Moves to Opportunity: Experimental Evidence on Barriers to
Neighborhood Choice 7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 26164, 2020),
https://opportunityinsights.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/cmto_paper.pdf.
31 Id.
32 BERUBE ET AL., supra note 21, at 11–13.
33 Kneebone & Holmes, supra note 3.
34 Id.
35 Lambert, supra note 10.
36 Economically Distressed Neighborhoods: Cleveland Profile, FUND FOR OUR ECONOMIC
FUTURE
(July
29,
2016),
http://www.thefundneo.org/content/uploads/attachments/Cleveland_Economically%20distress
ed%20neighborhoods%202016_0.pdf.
37 Id.
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number is 47%.38 In Youngstown, it is even worse at 52%.39 To put these figures into
context, the typical household in these neighborhoods earns roughly $18,323 per year,
compared to a regional median of $51,263.40 Labor force participation among
working-age adults in these neighborhoods is more than twenty percentage points
below the regional average.41 Unfortunately for residents of these neighborhoods, the
conventional government response for fighting poverty has failed them.

B. The Solution: Opportunity Zones
Enter Opportunity Zones: an unconventional solution to the problem of
concentrated poverty. Opportunity Zones have the potential to reverse the serious
dangers inherent in growing concentrations of poverty in America. Through a
provision in the tax code42 signed into law by President Trump as part of the TCJA,
Opportunity Zones fight poverty by directing private capital into low-income
communities through long-term equity investments.43 Simply stated, this initiative is
the “most ambitious Federal attempt to boost private investment in low-income areas
in a generation.”44

1. Origins and Congressional Intent
Initially hatched in a 2015 white paper by a bipartisan pair of economists, Jared
Bernstein and Kevin Hassett, Opportunity Zones are premised on the notion that
historic levels of investment could be made in downtrodden areas by unlocking private
capital.45 Bernstein and Hassett envisioned employing the vast amount of unrealized
capital gains, obtained by private individuals through the stock market’s record growth

38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Unless stated otherwise, all chapter and section references are to title 26 of the United
States Code (the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) and the Treasury Regulations (the
“Regulations”) issued thereunder.
43 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z (2018); see also The Promise of Opportunity Zones: Hearing Before
the Joint Economic Committee, S. Hrg. 115-297 at 7 (May 17, 2018) (statement of Mr. John
Lettieri) (“The fundamental purpose of this incentive is to encourage long-term equity
investment.”).
44 The Promise of Opportunity Zones: Hearing Before the J. Econ. Comm., 115th Cong. 7
(May 17, 2018) (statement of Mr. John Lettieri).
45 The paper was jointly written by Jared Bernstein, an economic adviser to former Vice
President and 2020 presidential hopeful Joe Biden, and Kevin Hassett, senior economic advisor
to President Trump and former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. See JARED
BERNSTEIN & KEVIN A. HASSETT, UNLOCKING PRIVATE CAPITAL TO FACILITATE ECONOMIC
GROWTH IN DISTRESSED AREAS 1 (Econ. Innovation Group eds., 2015).
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over the past decade, for the purpose of reinvestment in low-income communities.46
With estimates pegging the value of these unrealized capital gains at over six trillion
dollars in the United States, it was quickly clear that their idea had enormous
potential.47
By April 2016, a bipartisan group in Congress—consisting of Senators Cory
Booker (D-NJ) and Tim Scott (R-SC), as well as Representatives Ron Kind (D-WI)
and Pat Tiberi (R-OH)—bought into the idea and introduced the Investing in
Opportunity Act.48 In the next session of Congress, the Investing in Opportunity Act
was bundled into the TCJA and became law.
Congress’s intent for Opportunity Zones was evident: to help rebuild distressed
communities inflicted with concentrated poverty. For example, in a hearing before the
Joint Economic Committee, Senator Scott said,
Fifty-two million Americans live in distressed communities. I have
personally been raised in one of those distressed communities. . . . [T]he goal
of the legislation, is to make sure that those residents living in the
Opportunity Zones, those businesses located in the Opportunity Zones, the
property that could be rehabilitated in the Opportunity Zones, benefits from
a long-term view of making a community better without the gentrification.49
Similarly, Senator Booker told the committee that the goal of Opportunity Zones
was to “incentivize private investors to invest their inactive capital in high-impact
projects in economically distressed communities—in places like Camden and Newark
in my home State of New Jersey. In doing so, we can unleash a wave of transformative
investment and revitalize hard-hit rural and urban communities across the country.”50
The next section summarizes operates to achieve these aspirations.

46 Id. at 17 (“The explosion in unrealized capital gains and cash holdings presents an
opportunity for policies that create new incentive for private investors to redeploy capital to
regions in need of economic development.”); The Promise of Opportunity Zones, supra note 44,
at 3 (statement of Senator Martin Heinrich) (“Thanks to the long bull market, many investors
are sitting on substantial unrealized capital gains that we can put to work generating housing,
jobs, and growth.”); Noah Buhayar, Will ‘Opportunity Zones’ Help the Rich, the Poor or Both?,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201901-04/will-opportunity-zones-help-rich-poor-or-both-quicktake.
47 Opportunity Zones: Tapping into a $6 Trillion Market, ECON. INNOVATION GROUP (Mar.
21, 2018), https://eig.org/news/opportunity-zones-tapping-6-trillion-market (“the pot of
potential capital eligible for reinvestment in Opportunity Zones climbs to a total of $6.1
trillion.”); Pryce, supra note 16 (explaining that American households hold an estimated $3.8
trillion in unrealized capital gains and American corporations hold another $2.3 trillion).
48 See Investing in Opportunity Act, S. 2868, 114 th Cong. (2d Sess. 2016); Investing in
Opportunity Act, H.R. 5082, 114th Cong. (2d Sess. 2016).
49 The Promise of Opportunity Zones, supra note 44, at 5 (statement of Senator Tim Scott).
50 Id. at 35 (statement of Senator Cory Booker).
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2. How Opportunity Zones Operate
Operationally, Opportunity Zones consist of two provisions in the tax code: (1) the
designation process51 and (2) the tax benefits.52

a. The Designation Process
The process for designating communities as “Qualified Opportunity Zones”
(QOZs) began immediately upon passage of the TCJA in late 2017. First, the statute
provided the governor of each state with a ninety-day window to recommend a certain
number of census tracts within their state to the Department of Treasury for
designation status.53 Governors could select up to twenty-five percent (25%) of the
tracts within their states that were deemed “low-income” by the New Markets Tax
Credits program, a similar piece of legislation from 2000 that is discussed more in Part
II.C.54 Generally, this meant that tracts had to have a median income no greater than
eighty percent (80%) of the area’s median family income or a poverty rate in excess
of twenty percent (20%) to be eligible for recommendation.55 Then, upon receiving
the governors’ recommendations, the statute gave the Treasury Department a thirtyday period to approve the tracts as QOZs. 56
Ultimately, 8,761 tracts throughout the country were approved and, on average,
the approved QOZs had poverty rates that nearly doubled the national average.57
Designations are to remain in effect for ten years, expiring on December 31, 2028. 58
IRS guidance clarifies that many of the benefits—described below—will still be
available long after expiration in 2028.59
Unfortunately for communities with tracts left undesignated, the statutory
language indicates that no new tracts can be designated without another act of

51 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-1 (2018).
52 Id. § 1400Z-2.
53 Id. §§ 1400Z-1(b)(1)(A), 1400Z-1(c)(2)(B).
54 Id. §1400Z-1(d)(1).
55 See id. § 45D(e)(1); Rebecca Lester, Cody Evans, & Hanna Tian, Opportunity Zones: An
Analysis of the Policy’s Implications, 90(3) STATE TAX NOTES 221, 222 (October 15, 2018).
56 §§ 1400Z-1(c)(2)(A), 1400Z-1(b)(1)(B).
57 Boondocks and Boondoggles: A New Place-Based Policy Takes Shape, THE ECONOMIST,
Nov. 17, 2018, at 34; Lester, Evans & Tian, supra note 55, at 222 (“The average poverty rate
across the Zones is 28.7 percent, as compared to a national average of 15.1 percent.”).
58 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-1(f); see also Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 83 Fed. Reg.
at 54283.
59 See Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 83 Fed. Reg. at 54283 (“the proposed
regulations permit taxpayers to make the step-up election under section 1400Z-2(c) after a
qualified opportunity zone designation expires.”).
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Congress.60 And while further designations are certainly possible after 2028, it seems
unlikely that Congress will designate more QOZs before then, absent overwhelming
evidence that the program is working. This Note opposes the designation of more
QOZs before 2028 for reasons discussed in Part III.B.

b. The Tax Benefits
On June 14, 2018, the Treasury Department completed the designation process.61
Immediately, investors were eligible for three tempting federal tax incentives for
reinvesting their capital gains into QOZs: (1) a tax-free rollover of their reinvestment;
(2) up to 15% step-up in basis in their reinvestment; and (3) a complete exemption of
any capital gain generated by their reinvestment. The first benefit allows investors to
defer recognition of any capital gains62 that are reinvested into an Opportunity Zone,
for federal taxation purposes, until as late as December 31, 2026, if the investment is
not sold before then.63 Because capital gains are usually subject to a federal tax rate
of 15-20% when recognized, deferrals allow investors to put more capital to work
immediately.64 Accounting for the time value of money, such deferrals present
investors with potentially significant economic benefits.65
The second benefit provided by Opportunity Zones is a series of step-ups in basis
that reduce an investor’s tax burden on the initial capital gain when the reinvestment

60 Under §1400Z-1(b)(1), the text indicates that the only census tracts that are designated as
Qualified Opportunity Zones are those that (1) are nominated by a governor and (2) certified by
the Secretary of Treasury before the end of the 30-day “consideration period. While the law
allowed for an extension of the consideration period, it limited that extension to another 30 days,
which has long passed. See id. § 1400Z-1(b)(2).
61 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury, IRS Announce Final Round of
Opportunity Zone Designations (June 14, 2018), https://home.treasury.gov/news/pressreleases/sm0414.
62 A “capital gain” is the difference between the cost paid for a capital asset and the amount
realized when that asset is sold. Almost everything owned for investment purposes is considered
a capital asset. Common examples are houses, stocks, bonds, and personal-use items. Topic No.
409 Capital Gains and Losses, Internal Revenue Service, Jan. 28, 2019,
https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc409; Opportunity Zones: Tax-Free Gains, 51 No. 10 MORTG.
& REAL EST. EXEC. REP. NL 1 (July 15, 2018).
63 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-1(b).
64 See DEBORAH A. GEIER, U.S. FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 407 (6th ed.
2019) (“The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 . . . restored the 20% net capital gain rate
for such gain within Taxable Income exceeding $400,000 . . . Net capital gain within Taxable
Income below those thresholds remains generally at 15%.”); Topic No. 409 Capital Gains and
Losses, supra note 62 (“The tax rate on most net capital gain is no higher than 15% for most
individuals . . . However, a net capital gain tax rate of 20% applies to the extent that [a
taxpayer's] taxable income exceeds the thresholds set for the 15% capital gain rate.”).
65 SEAN LOWRY & DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45152, TAX INCENTIVES
FOR OPPORTUNITY ZONES: IN BRIEF 6 (2018).
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is held for extended lengths of time.66 In other words, the law rewards investors for
keeping their money invested in QOZs by reducing the taxation rate on their initial
capital gains.67 If the investment is held for five years, “the basis of such investment
shall be increased by an amount equal to ten percent (10%) of the amount of gain
deferred.”68 If held for seven years, the basis of such property shall be increased by
an additional five percent (5%), providing taxpayers with the possibility of a fifteen
percent (15%) reduction.69
Finally, the third and most enticing benefit Opportunity Zones offer is a complete
exemption from federal taxation of all new capital gains derived from a QOZ
investment, provided the investment is held for at least ten years.70 The law states that,
In the case of any investment held by the taxpayer for at least 10 years and
with respect to which the taxpayer makes an election under this clause, the
basis of such property shall be equal to the fair market value of such
investment on the date that the investment is sold or exchanged.71
This last benefit—complete exemption from capital gains taxation—is the crux of
the Opportunity Zone regime because it both (a) provides investors with a tax-free
upside, leveling the playing field with areas that are traditionally “safer” investments,
and (b) encourages patient, long-term commitments to the low-income
neighborhoods.72 After ten years, it is projected that “an investor will see an additional
$44 for every $100 of capital gains reinvested into an Opportunity Fund in 2018
compared to an equivalent investment in a more traditional stock portfolio generating
the same annual appreciation.”73 A more in-depth look at the novelties and investment
applications of these provisions is discussed in Part III.A.

66 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(b)(2)(B) (2018); Opportunity Zones: Tax-Free Gains, supra note 62.
67 Opportunity Zones: A New Incentive for Investing in Low-Income Communities, at 1,
Economic Innovation Group, https://eig.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Opportunity-ZonesFact-Sheet.pdf (“The basis is increased by 10% if the investment in the Opportunity Fund is
held by the taxpayer for at least 5 years and by an additional 5% if held for at least 7 years,
thereby excluding up to 15% of the original gain from taxation.”).
68 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(b)(2)(B)(iii) (2018).
69 Id. § 1400Z-2(b)(2)(B)(iv).
70 Opportunity Zones: Tax-Free Gains, supra note 62.
71 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(c) (2018).
72 Opportunity Zones: A New Incentive for Investing in Low-Income Communities, supra note
67, at 2 (“The Opportunity Zones program is designed to incentivize patient capital investments
in low-income communities nationwide. All of the underlying incentives relate to the tax
treatment of capital gains, and all are tied to the longevity of an investor’s stake in a qualified
Opportunity Fund, providing the most upside to those who hold their investment for 10 years
or more.”).
73 Id. at 2.
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C. The History of Place-Based Economic Development
While the provisions described above—using capital gains deferrals and
exemptions to fight poverty in targeted neighborhoods—are novel, the concept of
funneling resources into low-income communities is not new. The idea has been
around for half a century and is known as place-based economic development. Placebased economic development is premised on the notion that “sufficient incentives will
induce business to locate where it does not usually locate and hire employees it does
not usually hire.”74 In essence, place-based economic development attempts to alter
business decisions on where to locate by making traditionally undesirable locations
more financially attractive.

1. The Shift Towards Place-Based Economic Development
a. Early Place-Based Development: Enterprise Zones and Empowerment
Zones
Place-based economic development was first revolutionized in the U.K. in the late
1970s with the creation of “Enterprise Zones.”75 Enterprise zones were intended to
encourage rapid transformation of certain low-income neighborhoods “in the most
depressed part of a city” by eliminating all taxes, regulations, wage controls, and
zoning laws within that neighborhood.76 The rationale was that enterprise zones—free
from nearly all red tape and taxation—would mimic a true free market economy,
which would allow resources to allocate more efficiently and jobs to flow to the zone’s
low-income residents because of newfound investment.
Enterprise zones quickly made their way across the Atlantic and into the halls of
Congress.77 By 1980, a federal enterprise zone program was proposed in the House of
Representatives.78 While disagreements between Congress and the George H.W. Bush
administration temporarily derailed the federal proposal,79 the states jumped at the
prospect of fighting poverty with enterprise zones. As a result, states were the primary

74 E. Scott Golden, Enterprise Zones: New Life for the Inner City, 4 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
243, 245–46 (1981).
75 Enterprise zones were initially proposed by the British urbanist Peter Hall in a 1977 speech,
in which he spoke of the potential benefits that downtrodden areas could receive, through the
free flow of labor and capital, if regulations and taxation were eliminated within limited
geographical areas. See id. at 267–68; Jennifer Forbes, Using Economic Development Programs
as Tools for Urban Revitalization: A Comparison of Empowerment Zones and New Market Tax
Credits, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 177, 179 (2006); Peter Hall, Enterprise Zones: A Justification,
INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 416, 416–17 (1982).
76 Golden, supra note 74, at 268.
77 Id. at 269–70.
78 H.R. 7240, 96th Cong. (2d Sess. 1980).
79 Ellen P. Aprill, Caution: Enterprise Zones, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341, 1341–42 (1993).
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drivers of place-based economic development throughout the 1990s.80 By the mid1990s, 37 states—including Ohio—and the District of Columbia had experimented
with some form of enterprise zone.81 Many of these programs were so successful that
they are still active today.82
The federal government finally acted in 1993 when President Clinton signed into
law “Empowerment Zones, Enterprise Communities, and Rural Development
Investment Areas” as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. 83 The
spending bill included over $25 billion in place-based tax incentives aimed towards
low income communities.84
In several ways, Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities were similar
to today’s Opportunity Zones. For example, they targeted areas with poverty rates
greater than 20%.85 Additionally, they mandated a vast majority of a “qualified”
business entity’s assets be held within the designated zone to qualify for federal
benefits.86
However, there are many important differences. First, Empowerment Zones and
Enterprise Communities were limited in number. The law permitted for the
designation of only nine Empowerment Zones and ninety-five Enterprise
Communities across the country.87 The scale was notably smaller than the 8,700+
QOZs. Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities had much less competition
for capital than QOZs.
A second important difference is the investment vehicle utilized. Empowerment
Zones and Enterprise Communities were funded primarily through “enterprise zone
facility bonds.”88 When 95% of net proceeds from the bond offering were utilized
within a designated zone, the bonds were completely tax-exempt.89 This provided a
powerful incentive to invest in designated communities. Nevertheless, tax-free bonds
are markedly different from the capital gains deferrals and exemptions available
through Opportunity Zones because of the risk-taking involved for businesses and
investors. Research indicates that a capital gains exemption might encourage higherrisk businesses, whereas tax-free bonds might be more beneficial to lower-risk
80 Forbes, supra note 75, at 177.
81 Aprill, supra note 79, at 1341–43; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.632 (West 2017).
82 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. 5-28-15-10 (2018); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 655/5.3 (2016);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 290.0065 (2012).
83 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 1993 Enacted H.R. 2264, 103 Enacted H.R.
2264, Pub. L. No. 103-66.
84 Susannah Camic Tahk, The Tax War on Poverty, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 791, 814 (2014).
85 See Pub. L. No. 103-66 § 1392(a)(4)(A).
86 See Pub. L. No. 103-66 § 1397B(b)(3) (“substantially all of the use of the tangible property
of such entity (whether owned or leased) is within an empowerment zone . . .”).
87 See Pub. L. No. 103-66 § 1391(b)(1)-(2).
88 Pub. L. No. 103-66 § 1394.
89 Pub. L. No. 103-66 § 1394(a).
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businesses.90 “[E]ntrepreneurs may choose external debt in order to keep ownership
and control of their firms, or they may choose external equity to help share the risk
with less risk-averse investors.”91
Additionally, Empowerment Zones included incentives above-and-beyond the taxfree bonds available for investments in the 95 Enterprise Communities. For example,
Work Opportunity Credits incentivized employers to hire low-income employees by
allowing them to deduct 25-40% of the wages that they paid those employees in their
first year on the job.92 Similarly, Empowerment Zone Employment Credits provided
employers with a 20% tax credit for wages paid to employees that lived and worked
in a federally-designated Empowerment Zone.93 Opportunity Zones have no such
provision to explicitly promote employment of a zone’s low-income residents.

b. New Markets Tax Credits
In 2000, Congress enacted the New Market Tax Credit (NMTC) program, which
President Clinton signed into law as part of the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act.94
As a major place-based development initiative, the program aimed to attract equity
investments into low-income communities through designated community
development entities (CDEs).95 Twenty years later, the program is still valid law after
continuous renewals by Congress. Widely hailed as an overwhelming success,
NMTCs are estimated to generate $8 in private investment for every $1 invested by
the federal government.96
Like many place-based development initiatives, NMTCs are designed to level the
playing field between low-income communities and wealthier communities in the
battle for capital investment. NMTCs accomplish this goal by increasing the after-tax
return to investors through a tax credit that offsets the amount of taxation due to the
federal government, which ultimately lowers the risk for investors and businesses. 97
The size of the incentive is quite significant. “Investors may claim a 39 percent credit

90 Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, The Economics of Small Business Finance: The Roles
of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle, 22 J. BANKING & FIN. 613,
624 (1998) (“high-growth, high-risk new ventures often obtain angel finance and/or venture
capital before they obtain significant amounts of external debt finance . . .”).
91 Id.
92 Tahk, supra note 84, at 815.
93 Pub. L. No. 103-66 § 1396; Tahk, supra note 84, at 816.
94 Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, H.R. 5662, 106 th Cong. (2000).
95 2 Tax Planning Real Estate Trans. § 17:22.
96
New
Markets
Tax
Credit
Program
Fact
Sheet,
CDFI
https://www.cdfifund.gov/Documents/NMTC%20Fact%20Sheet_Jan2018.pdf.

Fund,

97 Ted M. Handel, The New Markets Tax Credit Program: New Tax Credits Will Level the
Playing Field for Investments in Low-Income Areas, 25-Jan L.A. Law. 13 at 13 (Jan 2003);
GEIER, supra note 64, at 32–33.
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over seven years (30 percent in present value) on their federal income tax liability.”98
To qualify for tax credits, investments must be made in low-income communities,
which are statutorily defined as any census tract where the poverty rate is at least
twenty percent (20%) or, generally, where the median family income inside the tract
is eighty percent (80%) of the statewide or metropolitan average.99
In many ways, the NMTCs are very similar to Opportunity Zones. 100 For example,
both programs target the same low-income communities101 and incentivize longerterm investments by providing larger benefits the longer investment is held.102 Both
programs require that investments are equity investments rather than debt, which
deviates from other place-based development programs.103 Similarly, both programs
mandate that “substantially all” of the business assets—in which Opportunity Zone
and NMTC money is invested—be kept within the qualified area.104 Finally, both
programs require annual compliance filings with the Treasury Department.
Despite the many similarities, Opportunity Zones differ from NMTCs in a couple
important aspects. First and foremost, Opportunity Zones involve far fewer
administrative barriers than NMTCs. Unlike with NMTCs, Opportunity Zone
investors are not required to submit proposals to the government nor await approval
before investing in low-income communities.105 Qualified Opportunity Funds can
self-certify. Upon receiving approval from the Community Development Financial
Institutions Fund (CDFI), community development agencies must enter into allocation
agreements with the CDFI that strictly specify the terms and conditions of tax credit
usage. No such agreement is required for Opportunity Zone investors. Additionally,
although NMTCs and Opportunity Zones both require annual compliance tests,
NMTCs demand satisfaction of two tests—the “primary mission” test and the
“community accountability” test106—whereas Opportunity Zone reporting only
requires compliance with a single test.
98 Handel, supra note 97, at 13.
99 26 U.S.C. § 45D(e)(1) (2018).
100 Lester, Evans & Tian, supra note 55, at 226 (“The Opportunity Zone incentive closely
resembles the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) program . . .”).
101 The Opportunity Zones explicitly use the same definition for “low-income community”
as used in NMTCs. See 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-1(c)(1) (2018) (“The term ‘low-income community’
has the same meaning as when used in section 45D(e).”).
102 NMTCs provide tax credits of 5% in the first three years, then 6% for the final four years.
See 26 U.S.C. § 45D(a)(2) (2018). Similarly, Opportunity Zones provide a 10% step-up in basis
when investments are held for five years, then an additional 5% when held for seven years. See
26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(b)(2)(B) (2018).
103 See Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 83 Fed. Reg. 209 (proposed Oct. 29, 2018)
(to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.400Z-2(a)-1(b)(3)) (“an eligible interest in a QOF is an equity
interest issued by the QOF.”); 26 U.S.C. § 45D(b) (2018).
104 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 45D(b)(1)(B) (2018); 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(3)(A)(i) (2018).
105 Lester, Evans & Tian, supra note 55, at 226–27.
106 The “primary mission” test requires that the entity’s organizational documents clearly
show that its purpose is to serve the needs of low-income communities and “at least 60 percent
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The second important distinction between the two programs is that NMTCs have
funding caps and Opportunity Zones do not.107 For example, NMTCs capped
nationwide funding for the program at $1 billion in 2001, $5 billion in 2008, and a
steady $3.5 billion from 2010 through 2019.108 Accordingly, the CDFI restricted
allocations of credits to a single CDE to a $100 million maximum. Because of these
caps, “only 16.1 percent of applications from 2003 to 2017 received [NMTC]
funding.”109 Opportunity Zone investors are not hamstrung by funding caps and are
permitted to invest as much as they want in Opportunity Zones, then receive equivalent
tax benefits.
A third notable difference is the nature of the benefit provided to investors. As
implied by the name, NMTCs provide a tax credit, whereas Opportunity Zones
provide capital gains deferrals and the potential for nonrecognition of future gains.
Tax credits offset the amount of tax due, meaning that “a $1 tax credit saves $1 in tax
for taxpayers in every tax bracket” on their gross income. 110 Capital gains taxes are
the taxes paid on investments—different than ordinary income for taxation purposes—
and are generally taxed at lower rates than traditional income. 111 The policy purpose
for taxing capital gains at a lower rate than ordinary income is to encourage more risktaking and entrepreneurship.112 Thus, by tailoring Opportunity Zones towards capital
gains rather than ordinary income, Congress is promoting risk-taking even more by
allowing investors to keep a greater percentage of their upside.

c. Promise Zones
A decade after the enactment of NMTCs, as some of the Empowerment Zones and
Enterprise Communities of the 1990s began to expire, President Obama put his own
touch on place-based economic development with the “Promise Zone” initiative.113
of the products and services of the entity must be devoted to serving these communities or
persons.” Handel, supra note 97, at 14. The “community accountability” test requires that “at
least 20 percent of the governing board of the entity or an advisory committee formed by the
entity must include representatives of low-income communities within the service area.” Id.
107 Lester, Evans & Tian, supra note 55, at 227 (explaining how Opportunity Zones are
notably different from New Markets Tax Credits because there are no funding caps).
108 See 26 U.S.C. § 45D(f)(1) (2018).
109 Lester, Evans & Tian, supra note 55, at 227.
110 GEIER, supra note 64, at 32–33.
111 See, e.g., id. at 407.
112 Id. at 415.
113 See generally MEMORANDUM to the HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES,
PRIORITIZING FEDERAL INVESTMENTS IN PROMISE ZONES, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (2016); Fact Sheet: President Obama’s Promise Zones Initiative,
White House Press Release, (Jan. 8, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/01/08/fact-sheet-president-obama-s-promise-zones-initiative; James Hall, The
Promise Zone Initiative and Native American Economic Development: Only the First Step
Forward Toward the Promise of a Brighter Future, 40 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 249, 268 (2016).
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Unable to reach a deal with Congress for a program the size of Clinton’s, the Promise
Zone initiative was an executive action that designated twenty economically distressed
jurisdictions across the country to receive federal support.114 Promise Zones partnered
the Department of Health and Human Services and Department of Agriculture with
local leaders to assist them with the bureaucratic process of attaining federal grants
and tax incentives.115 Although they showed potential, it was clear early on that
Promise Zones were “not the ideal vehicle” to raise communities out of poverty
because their lack of congressional approval limited their scope and resources. 116

2. Critiques of Place-Based Economic Development
After half a century in practice, place-based economic development has been the
subject of serious debate.117 Critics are mainly concerned with a lack of distributive
equity.118 They argue that the benefits of place-based policies mainly flow to the
wealthy investors, leaving the poor stuck in dead end, low-paying jobs.119 In the same
vein, many critics fear that “successful” place-based policies result in gentrification,
which displaces the intended beneficiaries.120 Others worry that the foregone revenue,
given away in the form of tax breaks, will never be fully recovered. 121
Conversely, supporters of place-based programs believe that these worries can be
alleviated through effective legislative drafting.122 Proponents argue place-based
economic development is more effective at fixing the specific problem at hand—
highly concentrated poverty—than more traditional welfare programs because it
geographically targets the areas where help is needed most. 123 Place-based
development, supporters contend, provides the benefits of flexibility and market

114 Hall, The Promise Zone Initiative, supra note 113, at 263–65.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 289.
117 See generally ALAN H. PETERS & PETER S. FISHER, STATE ENTERPRISE ZONE PROGRAMS,
HAVE THEY WORKED? (W.E. Upjohn Inst. Emp. Res. 2002).
118 Tahk, supra note 84, at 826–27.
119 Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic Development as Progressive Politics: Toward
a Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399, 407–08 (2001).
120 See id. at 448 (2001); Tahk, supra note 84, at 815 (“[T]hese projects do not assist the
poor, but instead help higher-income residents enjoy services in what rapidly become gentrified
neighborhoods.”).
121 Golden, supra note 74, at 264.
122 See infra Part IV.
123 PETERS & FISHER, supra note 117, at 25.
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responsiveness not found with traditional welfare payments. 124 Similarly, supporters
claim that, unlike welfare programs run through large bureaucracies, place-based
development results in administrative ease because the vast majority of these programs
are implemented through the tax code.125 Moreover, proponents note that place-based
development has non-economic advantages, including a less stigmatizing effect on
beneficiaries when compared to traditional welfare programs. 126 Finally, place-based
development tends to have broad political support.127 Bipartisan backing is especially
important for the success of Opportunity Zones in an era of political uncertainty
because it encourages investors that the incentives will not be repealed and may even
be renewed for another ten years.128

D. Status Quo: Current Approach in Ohio, Cuyahoga County, and Cleveland
With these critiques in mind, state and local governments across the country have
implemented various forms of place-based economic development in their
communities. Ohio is no exception. The next three subsections summarize the placebased economic development policies that the State of Ohio, Cuyahoga County, and
City of Cleveland utilize to fight poverty.

1. Ohio
Like many states in the 1990s, Ohio experimented with place-based development
through the creation of its own Enterprise Zone Program (EZP) in 1994.129 The
legislature enacted EZP to provide “tax incentives to businesses in depressed areas to
promote job creation and economic development,”130 and it remains enshrined in the
Ohio Revised Code after renewals by the General Assembly.131 As it stands today,

124 Tahk, supra note 84, at 832–34; see also Golden, supra note 74, at 260 (“[B]y using tax
preferences the public sector leaves more decisions to the private sector, and this situation is
likely to lead to increased innovation and diversity in the economy.”).
125 Tahk, supra note 84, at 829–32.
126 Id. at 828–29.
127 See id. at 820–26; see also Partridge & Rickman, supra note 10, at 204 (“[T]here may be
more widespread voter support for targeting disadvantaged locations than disadvantage
people.”).
128 Lester, Evans & Tian, supra note 55, at 228 (“The proposal had more than [one hundred]
Democratic and Republican cosponsors when it was included in the [Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of
2017], suggesting broad bipartisan support.”); Opportunity Zones, ECON. INNOVATION GROUP
https://eig.org/opportunityzones/history (last visited Nov. 2018).
129 S.B. 19, 120th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1994).
130 See Mark Cassell, Ph.D., Zoned Out: Distribution and Benefits in Ohio’s Enterprise Zone
Program,
POL’Y
MATTERS
OHIO
(2003),
https://www.policymattersohio.org/files/research/ezreport.pdf.
131 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.61 (West 2018).
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Ohio’s EZP permits local officials to negotiate tax incentive agreements with
prospective companies that include exemptions of up to 75% of the assessed values
on real and personal property for up to ten years.132 Alternatively, exemptions of 60%
on new investments in buildings, machinery, equipment, inventory, and improvements
to existing land and buildings for specific projects can be negotiated for ten years, as
well.133 Evidence suggests the program is becoming more popular as more businesses
are taking the state up on its offer and moving into distressed areas. 134
On top of EZP, Ohio Governor Mike DeWine signed into law a state-level
“Opportunity Zone Investment Credit” in July 2019.135 Under the new law, Ohio
provides a nonrefundable personal income tax credit equal to ten percent (10%) of
capital gains reinvested by individuals into qualified Opportunity Funds operating
within one of the state’s 320 QOZs. 136 Unlike the federal government, which taxes
capital gains at a lower rate than ordinary income, Ohio includes capital gains in
ordinary income for taxation purposes. Thus, Ohio’s Opportunity Zone Investment
Credit presents investors with the potential for quite significant income tax savings.137

2. Cuyahoga County
Cuyahoga County’s leadership is also warming up to the notion of place-based
development.138 In a recent “Five-Year Development Plan,” the County explicitly

132
Ohio
Enterprise
Zone
Program,
OHIO
DEV.
SERVS.
AGENCY,
https://development.ohio.gov/files/bs/ez_OhioEnterpriseZoneProgram.doc (last visited Nov.
28, 2018).
133 Id.
134 By October 2005, eleven years into EZP’s existence, Ohio had 339 active enterprise zone
agreements. See Cassell, supra note 130, at 3. As of November 9, 2018, there were 1079 active
agreements throughout the State of Ohio, 37 of which were in Cuyahoga County. See Business
|
Tax
Incentives,
OHIO
DEV.
SERVS.
AGENCY,
https://development.ohio.gov/OTEISearch/ez/selection.aspx?County=All&Company=
(last
visited Nov. 9, 2018).
135 Amended Substitute H.B. 166, 133th Gen. Assemb., (Ohio 2019).
136 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 122.84(B) (West 2020).
137 For example, say Taxpayer A has an ordinary income of $200,000, but just sold her shares
of Amazon, Inc. for a gain of $500,000. This year, her taxable income in Ohio would be
$700,000. At current rates, she would owe the State roughly $32,449 in personal income taxes.
However, if she reinvests all $500,000 into a Qualified Opportunity Fund that invests in an Ohio
Opportunity Zone, she owes the State nothing. Because tax credits offset the amount of taxation
due, Taxpayer A would have $50,000 in credit (10% of $500,000) to offset the original $32,449
in tax liability. Unfortunately, because the credit is nonrefundable, Taxpayer A will not receive
a $17,551 refund from the State to account for the leftover credit.
138 County Executive Armond Budish recently remarked that Opportunity Zones were the
“best” thing to come from TCJA. Cuyahoga County Executive Debate, CITY CLUB OF
CLEVELAND (Oct. 30, 2018) https://www.cityclub.org/inc/audio-player.php?event_id=1191.
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listed “emphasize place-based development” as a key strategy for the future.139 The
County now offers a Place-Based/Mixed-Use Development Loan, which targets
funding towards “redevelopment projects concentrated in the urban core.”140
On March 21, 2019, Cuyahoga County announced “Opportunity CLE”—a privatepublic collaboration with the City of Cleveland, the Greater Cleveland Partnership,
Cleveland Development Advisors, Fund for Our Economic Future, and Cuyahoga
Land Bank—to draw capital towards the region’s Opportunity Zones.141 Mainly,
Opportunity CLE will market eleven of the region’s Opportunity Zones and create a
portal for businesses and developers to connect with potential investors. 142

3. City of Cleveland
On the municipal level, the City of Cleveland utilizes many financing and
incentive packages that are not uncommon amongst large U.S. cities. For example,
Cleveland uses place-based incentives to combat the growth of abandoned commercial
and industrial properties through its Vacant Property Initiative. 143 In exchange for
hiring a construction team consisting of at least 20% Cleveland residents—4% of
which must be low-income—and creating one full-time job for each $10,000 in city
assistance, Cleveland structures very favorable loans to private developers attempting
to revitalize downtrodden properties.144 Similar packages are offered through the
City’s Job Creation Incentive Program,145 Economic Development Loan Program,146
and more.147
Moreover, the City has been willing to experiment with other major place-based
investments. One example is a unique project called the HealthLine where Cleveland
partnered with the regional transit authority to target $190 million of investment in
139 ARMOND BUDISH, CUYAHOGA COUNTY FIVE-YEAR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN
2018-2022 15 (2018).
140 Id.
141 Jordyn Grzelewski, ‘The Floodgates Are About to Open’: Cuyahoga County, Cleveland
Leaders Unveil Opportunity-Zone Plan, PLAIN DEALER (March 21, 2019),
https://www.cleveland.com/news/2019/03/the-floodgates-are-about-to-open-cuyahogacounty-cleveland-leaders-unveil-opportunity-zone-plan.html.
142 Id.
143 Mayor Frank G. Jackson, Vacant Property Initiative, CITY OF CLEVELAND,
http://rethinkcleveland.org/Cleveland/media/Cleveland/Documents/VPI-Program.pdf.
144 Id.
145Job Creation Incentive Program, CITY OF CLEVELAND, DEP’T OF ECON. DEV.,
https://rethinkcleveland.org/incentives/job-creation-incentive-program (last visited Feb. 11,
2019).
146 Incentives & Financing, CITY OF CLEVELAND, DEP’T OF ECON. DEV.,
https://rethinkcleveland.org/grow-and-expand/incentives-and-financing (last visited Feb. 11,
2019).
147 Id.
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transportation infrastructure along a nine-mile stretch of blighted roads.148 Over a
decade, the HealthLine spurred an estimated $9.5 billion of private development. 149
Hailed by one local leader as “one of Cleveland’s greatest place-based achievements
in the modern era,” the HealthLine overhaul should serve as a blueprint for further
place-based development in Cleveland.

III. MAKING THE MOST OF OPPORTUNITY ZONES: INVESTORS
Opportunity Zones are an attempt by Congress to align the profit-driven motives
of investors with the people-driven motives of local communities. This Part explores
the first half of the connection and asks: how can investors make the most out of
federal Opportunity Zones? Detailed below are a few important guidelines for
investors to keep in mind when reinvesting their capital gains in Opportunity Zones.

A. Passive Investors
1. Benefits for Passive Investors
Individual investors seeking passive ownership are fully eligible to take advantage
of the sizeable federal tax benefits made available through Opportunity Zones. 150
Upon investment, these benefits include a deferral of gains from their federal tax bill
for several years, a reduction of basis from their federal tax bill by as much as 15%,
and, in some circumstances, a complete elimination of federal taxation on certain
gains.151
For example, if Taxpayer A purchased one share of Amazon, Inc. stock in July
2017, when its price was $1,000 per share, and then sold the stock in September 2018,
when the price was $2,000 per share, she would have realized a gain of $1,000. 152
Ordinarily, this gain—a capital gain—is subject to a federal tax rate of 15-20%.153 In
other words, Taxpayer A would walk away with a net profit of $800-850 while the
federal government would take $150-200. However, by reinvesting that capital gain
of $1,000 into an Opportunity Zone, Taxpayer A can benefit tremendously.

148 RTA’s HealthLine – the World-Class Standard for BRT Service, GREATER CLEVELAND
REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITY (Oct. 2018), http://www.riderta.com/healthline/about.
149 Id.
150 The Regulations clarify this point, clearly stating that individuals are eligible taxpayers
under the statute. See Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 83 Fed. Reg. at 54, 290.
151 See 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(b) (2017).
152 Amazon.com, Inc. Common Stock (AMZN) Historical Stock Prices, NASDAQ,
https://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/amzn/historical (last visited May 14, 2019).
153 Topic No. 409 Capital Gains and Losses, supra note 62 (“The tax rate on most net capital
gain is no higher than 15% for most [taxpayers] . . . . However, a net capital gain tax rate of
20% applies to the extent that [a taxpayer’s] income exceeds the thresholds set for the 15%
capital gain rate.”).
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Say Taxpayer A reinvests the money into a Qualified Opportunity Fund that
operates a startup pizza chain called “OZ Pizzeria” in a QOZ. If Taxpayer A keeps her
investment in the Opportunity Zone for five years, then withdraws her money, the
taxation basis for her investment will be reduced by ten percent (10%).154 This means
that $100 of her $1,000 capital gain will be untaxed, while the standard rate of 15-20%
will be applied to the remaining $900. In other words, she will now receive a net profit
of $820-865, excluding the gains made by the new investment.
If she holds the investment for seven years, the taxation basis for her investment
will be reduced by another five percent (5%).155 Consequently, $150 of her $1,000
capital gain will go untaxed, while the remaining $850 will be taxed at 15-20%. Now,
her net profit from the Amazon stock sale amounts to roughly $830-872.5. These
calculations do not consider the time value of money, which provides investors with
considerable economic benefits on its own.156 By deferring taxation several years, the
“aggregate tax paid by the owner is less in real economic terms than it would be if the
taxpayer’s wealth increases were taxed each year as they accrued.”157 For instance,
the “present value” of Taxpayer A’s future $150-200 obligation—not accounting for
the steps-up in basis—would be only $121.95-162.6, as this is the amount that she
would have to set aside today for it grow (at a 3% interest rate, after taxes) to $150200 by the end of Year 7.158
Moreover, any further capital gains ascertained because of Taxpayer A’s
investment in OZ Pizzeria will be tax-free.159 In words, if Taxpayer A’s ten-year
investment results in an additional gain of $1,000, the entirety of that $1,000 new gain
will go to into Taxpayer A’s pocket tax-free, in addition to the $830-872.5 of her initial
investment from Amazon, Inc.
If Taxpayer A had instead reinvested her $1,000 gain into another traditional
investment, she would have immediately paid the federal taxes on her initial gain from
Amazon, Inc. Comparatively, she would only be able to reinvest 80-85% of her
Opportunity Zone capital. Then, upon exiting her new investment, any new gains
would again be subject to a federal taxation rate of 15-20%, meaning she would only
receive $800-850 in a new gain of $1,000.
At the end of the day, utilizing Opportunity Zones can result in a double-digit
percentage return on investment when compared to ordinary investments of similar
nature.160

154 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(b)(2)(B)(iii) (2017).
155 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(b)(2)(B)(iv) (2017).
156 GEIER, supra note 64, at 9 (“The ability to defer the taxation of unrealized gain in property
until a realization event provides a critically important financial benefit to those whose income
is in the form of such gain.”).
157 Id.
158 Id. at 9–11.
159 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(c) (2017).
160 Federal tax savings of over 10% in the hypothetical above.
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2. Investment in Practice
In practice, passive investment in Opportunity Zones is accomplished by first
electing to defer federal capital gains taxation on an IRS Form 8949, Sales and Other
Dispositions of Capital Assets, then through reinvestment in a Qualified Opportunity
Fund (QOF).161 A QOF is an investment vehicle organized as a corporation or
partnership for the purpose of investing in Qualified Opportunity Zone Property
(QOZP) and these vehicles must hold at least 90% of their assets in QOZP. 162 The
statute considers stock and partnership interests in a Qualified Opportunity Zone
Business (QOZB) as QOZP. It also considers Qualified Opportunity Zone Business
Property (QOZBP) as QOZP.163 While all of these terms are confusing, their
differences are legally significant. To provide a simple example, if Taxpayer A wants
to benefit from Opportunity Zones, she must invest in a QOF. Then, the QOF she
invested in—let’s call it the Cleveland Fund—must hold at least 90% of its assets in
QOZP. If all the Cleveland Fund’s assets were stock ownership in OZ Pizzeria, a
subsidiary of the Cleveland Fund that qualifies as a QOZBP, then the Cleveland Fund
satisfies the 90% requirement and Taxpayer A is eligible for tax benefits because of
her investment. The Cleveland Fund would also satisfy the 90% requirement if it
operated OZ Pizzeria on its own, instead of as a QOZB subsidiary, as long as it met
the requirements described in Part III.C.
Generally, investments in a QOF operate like investments in other corporations
and partnerships. However, the statute and Regulations place several important
limitations on these investments. First and foremost, the only gains eligible for
beneficial tax treatment are gains treated as capital gains for federal income tax
purposes, including section 1231 gains.164 The Regulations make this point evident,
despite a lack of statutory clarity.165 The importance of this elucidation is that it
comports with Congress’s long history of giving preferential treatment to capital gains
in order to increase the availability of capital for business investment. 166 It is also
161 See Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 83 Fed. Reg. at 54,282.
162 See 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(d) (2017); Michael March & Brandon Mourges, Opportunity
Zones: The Good, The Bad, and the Yet to be Defined, 2019-WTR Inside Basis 8,
https://www.fedbar.org/section-on-taxation/wpcontent/uploads/sites/128/2019/12/InsideBasis-Winter2019-v4-pdf.pdf.
163 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(2)(A) (2017).
164 Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 83 Fed. Reg. at 54,290; see also id. at 54280
(“Eligible gains, therefore, generally include capital gain from an actual, or deemed, sale or
exchange, or any other gain that is required to be included in a taxpayer’s computation of capital
gain.”).
165 Compare id., with 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(a)(1) (2017) (“Treatment of gains.--In the case
of a gain from the sale to, or exchange with an unrelated person of any property. . . .”).
166 Congress began providing preferential treatment for capital gains as early as the Revenue
Act of 1921. See J. MARTIN BURKE & MICHAEL K. FRIEL, TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME 746
(10th ed. 2012); see also id. at 750 (“[W]hen capital gains are given preferential tax treatment,
people are encouraged to save (by investing in stock, etc.), thus increasing the capital available
for business investment. The availability of investment funds for capital formation is
particularly critical to new and small businesses. Furthermore, additional business investment
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significant because gains that do not satisfy the meaning of § 1222(11) are not be
eligible for preferential treatment from Opportunity Zone investments. 167 For
example, if Taxpayer A wants to reinvest short-term gains from the sale of a few
Amazon, Inc. shares that she just purchased two months ago, or she wanted to reinvest
dividends and interest earned on bonds, her reinvestments would not be eligible for
preferential tax treatment.
While Taxpayer A may invest ordinary gains and cash into QOFs, the IRS will
treat investments based on their eligibility for deferral. That is, if Taxpayer A makes
a $600,000 mixed investment into a QOF—funded partially by her $500,000 eligible
capital gain from the sale of Amazon, Inc. shares and partially by $100,000 from
another source of capital—the IRS will treat this as two separate investments for tax
purposes. Only $500,000 are eligible for tax benefits.
Another limitation on Opportunity Zone investments is that they must obtain an
equity interest in a QOF. In other words, the capital gain cannot be reinvested in the
debt of a QOF or QOZ business. This provision is unique and departs from similar
federal place-based economic development programs in the past. For instance, under
the Enterprise Zone program, taxpayers could purchase enterprise zone facility bonds
that were tax-exempt.168 The equity requirement involves more risk, which likely
explains the substantiality of the benefits offered to investors willing to take the risk.
A third constraint that passive investors should be wary of is the timeframe for
investment. Investors have only 180 days to reinvest their capital gains from the date
of sale or exchange.169 This window provides six months for investors to complete
the due diligence necessary before deciding where to invest their capital. On the back
end of the investment, the Regulations establish a hard deadline for investors to cash
out their equity. Unlike traditional equity interests in companies that can be indefinite,
the Regulations mandate that an investor’s interest in a QOF must be sold by the end
of 2047, in order to qualify for the tax benefits. 170
A final note for passive investors is the applicability of the passive activity loss
rule of section 469. For passive investors, like Taxpayer A, who simply provide
funding for a QOF without materially participating in the QOF’s trade or business,
their activity would be deemed “passive.”171 Generally, taxpayers may deduct all
losses from passive activities from all gains from passive activities for federal taxation
purposes.172 By choosing to reinvest capital gains into a QOF, investors will lose the
opportunity to offset those gains with passive losses during the immediate tax period.
results in greater productivity and a correspondingly higher standard of living. Denial of
preferential capital gain treatment would therefore significantly hinder economic growth.”).
167 The tax code only provides preferential treatment for “net capital gains” under 26 U.S.C.
§ 1(h) (2019). A net capital gain is defined as “the excess of the net long-term capital gain for
the taxable year over the net short-term capital loss for such year.” 26 U.S.C. § 1222(11) (2020).
168 26 U.S.C. § 1394 (2018); March & Mourges, supra note 162, at 8.
169 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(a)(1)(A) (2017).
170 See Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 83 Fed. Reg. at 54283.
171 See 26 U.S.C. § 469(c)(1) (2018).
172 BURKE & FRIEL, supra note 166, at 1086.
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B. Real Estate Developers
Real estate development is likely one of the biggest beneficiaries of Opportunity
Zones. While developers are entitled to the same tax deferments and exemptions as
passive investors, there are several important provisions of which developers must be
wary.173
To start, the statute mandates that property must have been acquired after
December 31, 2017, in order to qualify as QOZP.174 Because of this, developers who
already owned land within a tract before it was designated an Opportunity Zone may
not be able to benefit, as commentators have speculated, “based on the statute, current
land owners could not take advantage of the tax incentive.”175
Second, the statute mandates that after a QOF obtains property within an
Opportunity Zone, the QOF must “substantially improve” the property within 30
months.176 The clock for this two-and-a-half-year window begins ticking upon the
date of acquisition of the property.177 For developers, this requirement is nothing new.
The New Market Tax Credits have long required “substantial improvement” to real
property to qualify for tax benefits.178 Nevertheless, the statute left unclear what
satisfied this requirement for QOZs.
Generally, to establish “substantial improvement,” the additions to the basis of the
property must exceed an amount equal to the adjusted basis. 179 In other words, if the
adjusted basis of a building is $50,000, a developer must make additions equivalent to
$50,001 or more to qualify for substantial improvement. Alternatively, if the QOF
obtains property for a new and “original use,” it does not have to substantially improve
the property.180 While it makes sense that a new building built for original use by a
QOF need not be substantially improved, what about abandoned buildings on a
valuable piece of land?
The Regulations answer this question. The Treasury Regulations state, “land does
not need to be substantially improved to qualify as opportunity zone business property
and the value of land is not included when assessing if a building has been
substantially improved.”181 Moreover, a building or structure that has been vacant for
173 The Regulations specify that real estate investment trusts (REITs) are one of the many
business forms considered an “eligible taxpayer” for the purpose of the statute. See Investing in
Qualified Opportunity Funds, 83 Fed. Reg. at 54,290.
174 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(2)(D)(i)(I) (2017).
175 March & Mourges, supra note 162, at 8–9.
176 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(2)(D)(ii) (2017).
177 Id.
178 26 C.F.R. § 1.45D-1(d)(5) (2012).
179 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(2)(D)(ii) (2017).
180 March & Mourges, supra note 162, at 8.
181 Opportunity Zone Guidance Offers Flexibility for Investors, GRANT THORNTON (Oct. 24,
2018),
https://www.grantthornton.com/library/alerts/tax/2018/Flash/opportunity-zoneguidance-offers-flexibility.aspx.
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five years prior to purchase by a QOF or QOZB will satisfy the “original use”
requirement, meaning that it need not be substantially improved either. 182 Thus, it
appears possible for developers to purchase a building that has been abandoned for
more than five years and make no improvements, yet still receive the tax benefits from
the sale of the property at a later point when the value of the land underneath the
building has appreciated.

C. Businesses
Upon passage of the TCJA, it was unclear whether traditional businesses operating
within QOZs would be eligible to obtain Opportunity Zone benefits or whether the
benefits would be limited to real estate developers. Two rounds of IRS guidance later,
the answer is clear: businesses can and should take full advantage of Opportunity
Zones.

1. Businesses Eligible for Benefits
The first round of guidance clarified that many different types of business
entities—ranging from sole proprietorships and partnerships to S and C
corporations—will be considered “eligible taxpayers” for the purpose of receiving tax
benefits.183 This clarification is important because it gives businesses big and small
the green light to reinvest gains from a strong economy and reap the federal tax
benefits for doing so. For clarity’s sake, “eligible taxpayers” are the parties receiving
the federal tax benefits and should not be mistaken for “qualified opportunity zone
businesses,” which are the enterprises actually operating inside QOZs and are subject
to more stringent regulation. Put differently, eligible taxpayers own the equity interests
in the QOFs that invest in qualified opportunity zone businesses.
The Regulations also made clear that pre-existing entities may become QOFs, if
they are eligible, by self-certifying.184 Self-certification requires that an eligible entity
submit an IRS Form 8996, Qualified Opportunity Fund.185 QOF eligibility requires
that the investment vehicle (1) is organized as a corporation or partnership, (2) for the
purpose of investing in qualified opportunity zone property, and (3) that it hold at least
ninety percent (90%) of its assets in qualified opportunity zone property.186 To ensure
compliance, the statute mandates semi-annual reporting to the IRS.187 Such reporting
can be submitted using the IRS Form 8996.188

182 Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 84 Fed. Reg. 18654, 18688 (May 1, 2019) (to
be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
183 Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 83 Fed. Reg. at 54,290.
184 See id. at 54,293.
185 Id.
186 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(1) (2017).
187 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(1)(A) (2020).
188 See Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 83 Fed. Reg. at 54,283.
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2. Minimum Amount of Income Derived from Zone
For businesses seeking to operate as Qualified Opportunity Zone Businesses, one
major concern from TCJA’s text and first round of guidance was the applicability of
the fifty percent (50%) gross income requirement. Generally, TCJA requires that a
Qualified Opportunity Zone Businesses must (1) ensure that substantially all of its
tangible property is Qualified Opportunity Zone Business Property and (2) that “at
least 50 percent of the total gross income of such entity is derived from the active
conduct” business within a QOZ.189
The second round of guidance washed away many of the fears surrounding this
requirement, making clear that it would not be a significant hurdle for businesses. The
Regulations establish four different ways for businesses to satisfy the fifty-percent
rule: (1) at least fifty percent (50%) of the services performed for the company, based
on the total number of hours worked by employees and independent contractors, are
performed within a QOZ; (2) at least 50% of the total amount paid for services
performed for a company are performed within a QOZ; (3) the management or
operational functions performed within a QOZ are necessary for the generation of at
least 50% of the company’s gross income, and (4) a catchall category that can be
established by “facts and circumstances.”190 In other words, a company like OZ
Pizzeria need not worry about failing to qualify as a Qualified Opportunity Zone
Business simply because 51% of its income derives from delivery orders outside of
the QOZ. Under the second round of guidance, it is clear that OZ Pizzeria will satisfy
the fifty-percent requirement because it satisfies (1), (2), and (3).

3. Risk Minimizing Provisions
Opportunity Zones provide businesses with a “Working Capital Safe Harbor”
which allows them to hold cash, or other nontangible property, within the fund for 31
months. This provision buys businesses time for acquisitions, construction, and
rehabilitation, provided that they are equipped with a written plan and they satisfy the
meaning of “working capital” under section 1397C(e)(1).
Finally, the Code and Treasury Regulations provide businesses with the ability to
minimize the danger of investing in riskiest QOZs by allowing as much as 37% of an
entity’s property to be held outside of the QOZ, when operating through a subsidiary.
This is because a QOF must hold at least 90% of its assets in qualified opportunity
zone property.191 “Qualified opportunity zone property” is statutorily defined as
either: (i) qualified opportunity zone stock, (ii) qualified opportunity zone partnership
interest, or (iii) qualified opportunity zone business property.192 Qualified opportunity
zone business property is defined as holding “substantially all” of its property within
a QOZ.193 Finally, “substantially all” has been interpreted by the regulations as
189 26 U.S.C. §§ 1400Z-2(d)(3)(A), 1397C(b)(2).
190 See Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 84 Fed. Reg. at 18,658.
191 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(1) (2020).
192 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(2)(A) (2020) (emphasis added).
193 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(2)(D)(i)(III) (2020).
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70%.194 Therefore, businesses can diversify their risk by placing the bare minimum—
90%––of a QOF’s holdings into a QOZ. Then, the QOF can place the bare minimum
of 70% in qualified business property, while using the remaining portion outside of a
QOZ. Moreover, because land qualifies as QOZBP yet does not need to be
substantially improved and is unlikely to decrease in value as the surrounding area
improves, the Code minimizes the risk for businesses buying land to open new
facilities.

IV. MAKING THE MOST OF OPPORTUNITY ZONES: COMMUNITIES
Because Opportunity Zones are only two years old—and the Regulations are even
younger195—it is too early to assess their long-term impact on highly concentrated
poverty.196 However, place-based economic development policies have, historically,
demonstrated mixed results.197 This Note, in the next subsection, argues Opportunity
Zones will likely suffer the same fate.
Nevertheless, this Note also contends that local governments, like the City of
Cleveland and Cuyahoga County, can enact local legislation to ensure their
Opportunity Zones maximize their poverty-alleviating potential. Subsection B
explores several possibilities for accomplishing this goal by drawing on the insights
available from previous place-based economic development initiatives. Because of the
many commonalities between Opportunity Zones and the New Market Tax Credits
and various state and federal Enterprise Zone programs, analysis from these initiatives
is particularly valuable in assessing ways to improve Opportunity Zones.198
Subsection C converts these lessons into proposed legislation for Cleveland and
Cuyahoga County.

194 See Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 83 Fed. Reg. at 54,285.
195 At the time of this Note’s writing, the IRS has released two rounds of guidance. The first
was released on October 19, 2018. See Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 83 Fed. Reg.
at 54,279. The second round of guidance was issued on April 17, 2019. See Investing in
Qualified Opportunity Funds, 84 Fed. Reg. at 18,652.
196 Scott Eastman & Nicole Kaeding, Opportunity Zones: What We Know and What We
Don’t, TAX FOUNDATION (Jan. 8, 2019), https://taxfoundation.org/opportunity-zones-what-weknow-and-what-we-dont/.
197 Lester, Evans & Tian, supra note 55, at 10 (“research has produced mixed results – in
part due to the difficulty in measuring outcomes because of the variety of incentives
concurrently provided to the designated jurisdictions.”).
198 See, e.g., Dane Stangler, Turning Opportunity Zones Into Real Opportunities With
Launch
Pad,
FORBES
(Feb.
6,
2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danestangler/2019/02/06/turning-opportunity-zones-into-realopportunities-with-launch-pad/#7b9ca1c63bfe; LESTER, EVANS & TIAN, supra note 55, at 10
(“The Opportunity Zone incentive closely resembles the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC)
program . . . .”).
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A. Why Opportunity Zones Will Not Resolve Concentrated Poverty on Their
Own
Opportunity Zones are a step in the right direction but are unlikely to significantly
reduce concentrated poverty on their own. The two principal reasons for this
conclusion, based on analysis from similar place-based economic development
programs, are that (1) the TCJA designated too many of the wrong zones and (2) the
benefits flowing from QOZ status are limited in nature.
First, the TCJA allowed for too many zones to become “qualified.” Analysis from
the Brookings Institution indicates that the effectiveness of various enterprise zone
programs significantly diminished when governments liberally expanded the number
of targeted areas that qualified for incentives.199 The reason? Supply and demand.
When more zones are designated, the amount of private investment available to each
zone is reduced––assuming that the amount of capital available is relatively fixed.
Another problem with too many designations is that a gap develops between zones
that desperately need the investment and zones that could use the investment. When
zones that desperately need investment are pitted against better-off zones that could
use the investment, investors will perceive less risk in the latter and investment will
divert away from the areas that need it most.
Are there too many Opportunity Zones? Nationally, the answer is unclear. As
stated previously, the Treasury Department designated more than 8,700 census tracts
throughout the United States as Qualified Opportunity Zones. 200 The number of
Opportunity Zones far exceeds the nine Empowerment Zones and ninety-five
Enterprise Communities designated in the mid-1990s.201 However, TCJA limited the
number of designations to roughly a quarter of the number of low-income
communities available for New Market Tax Credit investment. 202
The answer is clearer when viewed from the state and local levels. For example,
Ohio is now home to 320 Opportunity Zones.203 Yet, only 41% of the poorest census
tracts in the state were recommended for designation by former governor John
Kasich.204 In Cuyahoga County, which has sixty-four Opportunity Zones, the entire
199 See HILARY GELFOND & ADAM LOONEY, LEARNING FROM OPPORTUNITY ZONES: HOW TO
IMPROVE
PLACE-BASED
POLICIES
1
(2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/Looney_Opportunity-Zones_final.pdf (“[P]oor geographic targeting
reduces the impact of the program and limits the benefits that accrue to poor residents.”).
200 Boondocks and Boondoggles, supra note 57, at 34.
201 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66 §1391(b), 107 Stat.
312, 543 (1993).
202 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-1(d)(1) (2020) (“the number of population census tracts in a State that
may be designated as qualified opportunity zones under this section may not exceed 25 percent
of the number of low-income communities in the State.”); see also id. (“The term ‘low-income
community’ has the same meaning as when used in section 45D(e).”).
203
Opportunity
Zones:
Background,
OHIO
DEV.
SERVS
https://development.ohio.gov/bs/bs_censustracts.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2020).

AGENCY,

204 WENDY PATTON & MICHAEL LEONARD, ASSESSING OPPORTUNITY ZONES IN OHIO 4–5
(2018), https://www.policymattersohio.org/research-policy/quality-ohio/revenue-budget/taxpolicy/assessing-opportunity-zones-in-ohio (“Although Ohio’s Opportunity Zones included
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city of East Cleveland—the poorest city in Ohio—was excluded from designation.205
Instead, many well-established and “up-and-coming” areas were designated.206 In
other words, more than half of Ohio’s poorest census tracts, including Ohio’s poorest
city, will not receive a cent of private investment from a program Congress explicitly
intended to boost economic growth in the poorest communities. 207 Moreover, the
extremely poor tracts that were fortunate enough to be designated—like Cleveland’s
Glenville neighborhood—must now compete for investment with “trendier” areas—
like Cleveland’s downtown business district and Ohio City neighborhood—which also
received designations.
While some blame for Ohio’s designations may fall on former Governor Kasich
for recommending the wrong tracts, the majority of the blame should fall on the
drafters of the legislation. If Cleveland’s downtown business district and trendy
neighborhoods qualified for designation, clearly the term “low-income community”
cast too wide of a net. But even if Kasich did not recommend many of the better-off
areas, selecting all sixty-four of the poorest tracts in Cuyahoga County would still be
suboptimal because the same problems seen with enterprise zones would result: too
many zones, not enough capital.
The second reason why Opportunity Zones, left alone, will not sufficiently
alleviate pockets of poverty is because their benefits are limited to the tax code. Much
recent literature about enterprise zones indicates that tax-based incentives, alone,
“have failed to reduce urban poverty and reverse the decline of urban communities,
even when . . . these policies have promoted the growth of downtown businesses.” 208
Why so? Because tax-code benefits cannot rebuild a neighborhood’s broken
infrastructure, nor can they train a neighborhood’s unskilled workforce or improve
policing. Tax-code benefits are limited to the short-term. Once the tax benefits expire,
the investors and businesses leave for more competitive areas and the poor
neighborhood is no better off.
The most successful poverty-alleviating policies “must also address complex
social problems.”209 They include improved workforce training, provision of

many census tracts in the highest-poverty quartile, most of the poorest 739 poorest tracts did
not make the cut. Less than half (41 percent) of the 100 tracts with the highest poverty rates,
where between 57 percent and 87 percent of the population live in poverty, were included in
Opportunity Zones.”).
205 Nick Castele, Cuyahoga County Won Dozens of Opportunity Zones. Now What?,
IDEASTREAM (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.ideastream.org/news/cuyahoga-county-wondozens-of-opportunity-zones-now-what.
206 Jay Miller, Zones are Producing Mixed Reactions, CRAINS CLEVELAND BUS. (April 1,
2018), https://www.crainscleveland.com/article/20180330/news/156761/opportunity-zonesare-producing-mixed-reactions-neo-officials; Governor Kasich’s recommendations for
Cuyahoga County include most of Downtown Cleveland and Ohio City, areas that have received
significant amounts of investment in recent years, yet excludes the entirety of East Cleveland.
207 See discussion about congressional intent supra Part II.B.1.
208 Cummings, supra note 119, at 449.
209 Scott A. Tschirgi, Aiming the Tax Code at Distressed Areas: An Examination and
Analysis of Current Enterprise Zone Proposals, 43 FLA. L. REV. 991, 1034 (1991).
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childcare, upgraded infrastructure, and the like.210 Only when these foundational
building blocks are in place will pockets of poverty begin their road to recovery.

B. Enhancing Opportunity Zones Through Local Legislation
Before crafting ordinances to supplement their Opportunity Zones, local
governments must develop a framework to maximize the effectiveness of any new
legislation. If the ultimate goal is to reduce concentrated poverty by boosting the
number of employment opportunities for residents in their city’s most impoverished
areas, then local legislators must prioritize leveling the playing field for their most
impoverished Opportunity Zones.
When considering how to do this, legislators should consider three factors. First,
what attributes do businesses and entrepreneurs consider when deciding where to
locate? Second, what additional incentives can city and county governments provide
to make their zones more attractive to those businesses and entrepreneurs? And, third,
how sizeable must the additional incentives be to justify the cost?
Turning to the first inquiry, site selection factors vary widely depending on the
industry and the size of the firm involved.211 For example, Elon Musk—CEO of Tesla,
now one of America’s largest automakers—recently explained his own factors for
where to build Tesla’s next manufacturing plant in the United States. “Incentives play
a role,” Musk said, “but so do logistics costs, access to a large workforce with a wide
range of talents, and quality of life.”212 Much of the literature on site selection is
consistent with Musk’s view. Large manufacturing firms tend to value access to a
large labor pool, high-quality labor, low wages, raw materials, a market for their
goods, and tax benefits.213 And for small-and-medium-sized companies, the “most
important factor [is] the availability of regional development assistance, followed by
the quality and size of the labor supply, including wage levels, and the potential for
future expansion.”214
As to the second inquiry, local governments can provide for these needs to make
certain places more attractive. For example, local legislation has the power to improve
the quality of an area’s workforce, lower labor costs, provide targeted infrastructure
projects, loosen regulations, and exempt certain taxation for specified areas.215

210 Id.
211 See, e.g., Charisia Vlachou & Olga Iakovidou, The Evolution of Studies on Business
Location Factors, 20(4) J. Dev. Entrepreneurship 1, 2 (2015).
212 Tim Higgins, Elon Musk Says Incentives, Costs Will Influence Site of New U.S. Tesla
Factory, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/elon-musk-saysincentives-costs-will-influence-site-of-new-u-s-tesla-factory-11583890306.
213 See generally Vlachou & Iakovidou, supra note 211; see also M. I. Logan, Locational
Decisions in Industrial Plants in Wisconsin, 46 LAND ECON. 325, 326 (1970).
214 Vlachou & Iakovidou, supra note 211 at 7 (citing Barry Moore, et al., The Influence of
Regional Development Incentives and Infrastructure on the Location of Small and Medium
Sized Companies in Europe, 28(6) URBAN STUDIES 1001–26 (1991)).
215 See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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Finally, in determining the size of incentives to provide, local governments must
consider much more than the ratio of private investment dollars returned for each
public dollar spent. To be sure, large financial returns, like Cleveland’s $9.5 billion
return on its $190 million HealthLine investment,216 are important. Nevertheless, local
governments must also weigh the numerous intangible benefits that flow from
investing in impoverished areas. These include positive externalities like the value of
upgrading residents’ skills and social capital217 or reducing gun violence.218
With this three-part framework in mind, the following subsections advance four
coherent strategies that have proven effective with previous place-based legislation.
Moreover, these four strategies serve as the basis for the legislation proposed, below,
in Part IV.C.

1. The Smaller the Better
Size matters. This rule is especially applicable in the context of place-based
economic development, regarding both the size and number of qualified tracts. The
bigger the size and number of qualified tracts, the less targeted the benefits become.
One example comes from the United Kingdom. In 2011, the British government
announced the creation of eleven enterprise zones to boost job growth around the
country. The largest and most ambitious of the eleven was the Humber Enterprise
Zone, which comprised an area of nearly 3,059 acres.219 Promoters of the zone
advertised its vast size as a perk and said the zone “aimed to create almost 5,000 jobs
by 2015.” 220 Yet, Humber’s great size and ambition fell flat. “In its first 28 months,
[the Humber Enterprise Zone] managed only 145” new jobs.221 By 2017, the Humber
Enterprise Zone had actually lost an estimated 320 jobs—a far cry from the 5,000 new
jobs that were projected.222 Meanwhile, another enterprise zone one-twentieth the size

216 See discussion supra Part II.D.3.
217 Raj Chetty & Nathaniel Hendren, The Impacts of Neighborhoods on Intergenerational
Mobility II: County-Level Estimates, at 28 (2017) (“[O]ur results suggest places with more
social capital and better schools tend to cause higher rates of upward mobility for both low and
high-income children.”).
218 One recent study found that simply treating abandoned buildings and vacant lots can
reduce local gun violence by as much as 39%, resulting in somewhere “between $5.00 and
$26.00 in net benefits to taxpayers and between $79.00 and $333.00 to society at large, for every
dollar invested.” Charles C. Branas, PhD, et al., Urban Blight Remediation as a Cost-Beneficial
Solution to Firearm Violence, Vol. 106, No. 12 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2158, 2162 (2016).
219 Humber Enterprise Zone, https://enterprisezones.communities.gov.uk/enterprise-zonefinder/humber-enterprise-zone/ (last visited May 11, 2020).
220 Opinion Divided on Success of Enterprise Zones, FINANCIAL TIMES (Dec. 26, 2013),
https://www.ft.com/content/72da4944-6be3-11e3-a216-00144feabdc0.
221 Id.
222 Caroline Brockelbank & Pritti Mistry, Enterprise Zones 'Failed to Deliver' Jobs Boost in
England, BBC NEWS (July 11, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-48856440.
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of Humber,223 the Bristol Temple Quarter Enterprise Zone, created an estimated 5,493
new jobs during the same period.224 While many factors were undoubtedly at work,
one cannot help notice the stark contrast between the two zones’ sizes and
effectiveness at creating new jobs.
Similarly, analysis of Ohio’s enterprise zones from the 1990s suggests that the vast
number of areas that were designated seriously hampered the overall success of
economic development.225 “In the early 1990s, the state of Ohio was quite liberal in
its rules permitting establishment of enterprise zones. As a result, many cities with
little or no economic distress established zones . . . .”226 In 1994, for instance, 62.5%
of Ohio cities—i.e. sixty-five cities—with populations of more than 15,000 were
designated as enterprise zones.227 But only 29.3% of those cities—i.e. nineteen
cities—were actually economically distressed.228 The analysis found that Ohio’s
liberal designation policy “further weaken[ed] the targeting effect of zone programs,
as a larger and larger portion of the state falls under the targeted program.”229 The
lesson: supplemental legislation should focus on reducing the number of qualified
tracts to ensure the targeting effect is maximized.
Applying this lesson locally requires rethinking how many zones should qualify
under supplemental legislation. Currently, there are sixty-four census tracts in
Cuyahoga County that are Opportunity Zones. Only twenty-six qualify as pockets of
poverty: 1033.00, 1078.02, 1039.00, 1041.00, 1046.00, 1049.00, 1087.01, 1123.01,
1128.00, 1131.01, 1187.00, 1188.00, 1189.00, 1965.00, 1135.00, 1138.01, 1141.00,
1143.00, 1145.01, 1146.00, 1147.00, 1193.00, 1164.00, 1181.01, 1186.02, and
1962.00. Instead of providing tax breaks to investors in the city’s downtown core,
designations should be limited to these twenty-six tracts that are actually “pockets of
poverty” with poverty rates of 40% or more. Doing so would significantly benefit the
poorest tracts’ ability to compete for private capital.

2. Public Investment Attracts Private Investment
Opportunity zones located in areas that already have “basic labor skills, public
infrastructure and transportation” are more likely to succeed than areas that lack these
basic components.230 Analysis from Illinois’s enterprise zone program suggests that
223 Press Release, Bristol Temple Quarter, Temple Quarter Enterprise Zone Opens for
Business (Apr. 25, 2013) (available at https://www.bristoltemplequarter.com/temple-quarterenterprise-zone-opens-for-business/).
224 Brockelbank & Mistry, supra note 222.
225 PETERS & FISHER, supra note 117.
226 Id. at 78.
227 Id. at 80.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 78–83.
230 Aprill, supra note 79, at 1341; see also Opinion Divided on Success of Enterprise Zones,
supra note 220.
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“the most successful enterprise zones were located in areas with adequate
infrastructures and public services.”231 For example, in the late 1980s, the State of
New York enacted an Economic Development Zone Program, which was designed to
attract businesses to low-income communities by offering a mix of tax credits, lowinterest loans, reduced property taxes and discounted utility bills. 232 However, the
State noted that the success of its program hinged not on the tax incentives, but the
additional job training, child care, affordable housing, and educational services that it
provided within those zones.233 These investments enabled New York’s zones to
differentiate themselves from other cities because they not only provided incremental
cost reductions in tax savings, but they also equipped companies with better skilled
workers who were not worried about child care or traveling long distances home after
work.
Yet, successful public investments have not been limited to traditional notions of
infrastructure and services. Some governments are investing in high-speed broadband
internet within their zones.234 Public investments in infrastructure like broadband
immediately provide downtrodden neighborhoods with a comparative advantage that
enables further private technology investment within the zone. Another example of
investment in services comes from Oregon, where two similar municipalities
established enterprise zones. The Oregonian city of Metras’ enterprise zone failed
while the city of Redmond’s flourished. What distinguished the two zones? Unlike
Metras, Redmond invested in an active marketing campaign that promoted the zone
to entrepreneurs throughout the state.235 The lesson: public investments within a zone
a crucial to spur private investments.
Taking note from these examples, Cuyahoga County and Cleveland must look
closely at their twenty-six poorest tracts to examine each tract’s weaknesses and then
commit substantial public resources for infrastructure, services, and job training to
create competitive advantages. For instance, a census tract like Glenville’s 1186.02
already has access to transportation infrastructure. It is located less than two miles
from Interstate 90 and surrounded on two sides by major railroads. Of course,
upgrading roads and public transit stations would help, but what the tract needs most
is job training and childcare services. In 2018, the Center for American Progress
labeled tract 1186.02 a “child care desert” with roughly fifteen children under the age

231 Tschirgi, supra note 209, at 1035.
232 Tom Redburn, 21 Enterprise Zones Created, Including 4 in New York City, N.Y. TIMES
(July 28, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/28/nyregion/21-enterprise-zones-createdincluding-4-in-new-york-city.html.
233 Tschirgi, supra note 209, at 1034; Admin.'s Enterprise Zone Proposal and H.R. 6, The
Enterprise Zone Improvements Act of 1989: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways and
Means, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 161 (1989) (statement of Liz Abzug, Director of the N.Y. State
Economic Development Zone Program).
234 Opinion Divided on Success of Enterprise Zones, supra note 220.
235 Nick Bjork, Enterprise Zones: What Works and What Doesn’t, DJC OREGON (Aug. 12,
2010), http://djcoregon.com/news/2010/08/12/enterprise-zones-what-works-and-what-doesnt/.
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of five for each available licensed childcare slot.236 By investing the necessary
resources into training and childcare, Opportunity Zones like Glenville’s 1186.02 can
develop the competitive advantages that made New York’s Economic Development
Zones successful in the 1980s.

3. Simplicity is the Ultimate Sophistication
Reducing red tape is key to ensuring zones flourish. An influential report from
the Heritage Foundation, analyzing the success of state enterprise zones in the 1990s,
argues that the most effective zones were those where government removed obstacles,
like certain forms of taxation, that hampered business growth. 237 Further, the report
promotes keeping zone benefits as simple as possible because “large amount of
paperwork . . . can be especially time-consuming for the small businesses which zones
are intended to attract.”238 As noted in Part II.D, all levels of government offer
different and often confusing investment incentives. Large corporations with fleets of
lawyers may be able to drudge through all of the paperwork and regulation that
accompanies these incentives but imagine the difficulty for a local entrepreneurs! The
lesson: remove growth-hampering regulations, but make qualification as simple as
possible.
Accordingly, Cuyahoga County and Cleveland should exempt businesses within
the twenty-six poorest tracts from sales taxation and their employees, who are also
residents of the tract, from municipal income taxation. Ohio is one of only fourteen
states that currently allows municipalities to levy their own separate individual income
taxes in addition to state income taxes.239 Cleveland uses this power to levy a two
percent (2%) local income tax on income earned within the city. Cleveland City
Council should exempt employees who work and reside within any of the twenty-six
QOZ tracts from local income taxation. Doing so would reduce paperwork for
employers and, more importantly, provide residents living in concentrated poverty
with an extra $2 for every $100 earned.
Similarly, Cuyahoga County should exempt the twenty-six QOZs from county
sales taxation. Currently, the county levies the highest sales tax in the entire state:
2.25% (1.25% collected for the county and 1.00% collected for the transit
authority).240 Exempting the selected QOZs from sales taxation would provide two

236 Rasheed Malik et al., America’s Child Care Deserts in 2018, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(Dec.
6,
2018),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/earlychildhood/reports/2018/12/06/461643/americas-child-care-deserts-2018/
237How to Create a Successful Enterprise Zone Program, HERITAGE FOUND. (June 9, 1992),
https://www.heritage.org/taxes/report/how-create-successful-enterprise-zone-program.
238 Id.
239 Tonya Moreno, U.S. Cities that Levy Income Taxes, THE BALANCE (Dec. 3, 2018),
https://www.thebalance.com/cities-that-levy-income-taxes-3193246.
240 Chris Stewart, Montgomery County Sales Tax Goes Up Monday; How Does It Compare
to
Other
Counties?,
DAYTON
DAILY
NEWS
(Sept.
30,
2018),
https://www.mydaytondailynews.com/news/sales-tax-rates-for-all-ohio-counties-how-doesyours-compare/60F4OSUL9msUH5NkW64RXI/.
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significant benefits for the zones. Not only would the exemption make purchases
cheaper for residents, many of whom live below the poverty line, but it would also
encourage non-zone residents to come to the zone to shop. The latter benefit would
essentially create a stronger market for goods and provide in-zone entrepreneurs with
a comparative advantage, because goods would cost consumers 2.25% less than
similar goods purchased outside the zone.
Finally, Cuyahoga County and the City of Cleveland must work together to
simplify the entire tax incentive process so that entrepreneurs have more time to focus
on what matters: running and growing their businesses. While this can be
accomplished in several ways, providing specialized employees to help entrepreneurs
with paperwork for the various federal, state, and local incentives would go a long
way.

4. Get Everyone Involved
Local buy-in can make or break place-based development. Some analysts have
argued that programs should provide more definitive roles for residents (on advisory
boards, etc.).241 It is believed that these provisions will provide another guard against
private interests from extracting too much out of local neighborhoods and decrease
the possibility of gentrification.242 The evidence on this point is stark.
In Baltimore’s Enterprise Zone, a success story that touted the creation of more
than 12,000 jobs for zone residents, the community played an active role in the
redevelopment of the tracts.243 This community engagement entailed the creation of
a Community Advisory Council, consisting mainly of local residents, who had the
power to approve and modify decisions of the committee that managed the Enterprise
Zone funding.244 On the other hand, the zones in Chicago and Philadelphia/Camden,
which did not establish councils like Baltimore, went as far as to disregard the input
of community activists. As a result, their communities opposed the development,
investors were not willing to take the risk, and the programs failed.245 The lesson: give
residents a voice.

C. Proposed Legislation for City of Cleveland and Cuyahoga County
The following proposals (“Proposed Legislation”) incorporate the aforementioned
lessons into legislation can be used as a model to maximize the concentrated-povertyalleviating potential of Opportunity Zones within the City of Cleveland and Cuyahoga
County. The Proposed Legislation would amend chapters 191, 192, and 137 of the

241 Forbes, supra note 75, at 201.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 186–87.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 187 (“Between 1995 and 2000, the Chicago zone posted a negative growth rate and
experienced less growth than in the previous five-year period when compared to similar areas
within the city.”).
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Codified Ordinances of Cleveland and titles 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the Cuyahoga County
Code.

1. City of Cleveland
a. Explanation of Legislation
The Proposed Legislation for Cleveland City Council identifies Cleveland’s
Opportunity Zones that qualify as pockets of poverty—that is, the twenty-six tracts
where over forty percent (40%) of the population lives below the poverty line—as
“Prioritized Opportunity Zones” and provides targeted benefits for residents and
investments within these zones. These benefits include an exemption from the local
income tax, a tax credit for workers, a directive to the city’s Commissioner of
Neighborhood Services to provide childcare services to residents of Prioritized
Opportunity Zones, a directive to the city’s Commissioner of Neighborhood Services
to create and oversee a “Community Advisory Board” consisting of residents of
Prioritized Opportunity Zones, and a directive to the city’s Commissioner of
Neighborhood Development to provide services that assist entrepreneurs with federal,
state, and local red-tape within these Prioritized Opportunity Zones.

b. Proposed Legislation
BE IT ORDAINED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF CLEVELAND:
Section 1. That the following sections of the Codified Ordinances of Cleveland,
Ohio, 1976,
Section 191.0901, as amended by Ordinance No. 2208-04, passed December 13,
2004,
Section 192.21, as enacted by Ordinance No. 1412-15, passed November 23, 2015,
Section 137.08, as enacted by Ordinance No. 57-94, passed June 13, 1994,
Section 137.10, as enacted by Ordinance No. 1329-10, passed December 6, 2010,
are amended to read as follows:
Section 191.0901 Sources of Income Not Taxed
The tax provided for in this chapter shall not be levied on the following:
(p) Compensation and net profits derived from a Qualified Opportunity Zone
Business by any taxpayer domiciled within a Prioritized Opportunity Zone.
Section 192.21 Credit for Person Working in Joint Economic Development
District or Prioritized Opportunity Zone
The municipality shall grant a credit against its tax on income to a resident of the
municipality who works in a prioritized opportunity zone, a joint economic
development zone created under RC 715.691, or a joint economic development district
created under RC 715.70, 715.71, or 715.72 to the same extent that it grants a credit
against its tax on income to its residents who are employed in another municipal
corporation, under Section 192.19 of this chapter.
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Section 137.08 Duties of the Commissioner of Neighborhood Services
The Commissioner of Neighborhood Services shall administer City programs for
the Department of Community Development that strengthen City neighborhoods
through direct services to homeowners, tenants, merchants, and community-based
institutions, that preserve dwelling units through direct loans and grants to property
owners for repairs, renovations, and energy conservation improvements, that maintain
safe, high-quality and affordable housing for low income households, and that provide
direct social services to low and moderate income citizens of the City, including
services provided by community-based institutions; shall establish and implement
initiatives to provide access to affordable childcare services to citizens residing within
a Prioritized Opportunity Zone; shall establish and oversee a “Community Advisory
Council” consisting of residents and small businesses residing within Prioritized
Opportunity Zones to provide recommendations to the Mayor regarding economic
development in their communities; and shall perform such other duties as may from
time to time be required by ordinance or by the Director of Community Development.
Section 137.10 Duties of the Commissioner of Neighborhood Development
The Commissioner of Neighborhood Development shall administer City programs
intended to encourage the development or improvement of residential and commercial
property in Cleveland’s neighborhoods; shall establish and implement initiatives to
simplify federal, state, and local tax and regulatory filings for neighborhood
entrepreneurs; shall manage public acquisition of real estate to be used in furtherance
of the City’s neighborhood development objectives; shall manage and propose
allocation of the City’s capital resources to provide incentives for private investment
in residential and commercial development within the City; shall plan and implement
City programs intended to foster the construction of safe, high-quality, and affordable
housing for low income residents; and shall perform such other duties as may from
time to time be required by ordinance or by the Director of Community Development.
Section 2. That the Codified Ordinances of Cleveland, Ohio, 1976, are
supplemented by enacting new Sections 191.031500, 191.0315001
to read as follows:
Section 191.031500 Prioritized Opportunity Zone
“Prioritized Opportunity Zone” means any of the following census tracts: 1033.00,
1078.02, 1039.00, 1041.00, 1046.00, 1049.00, 1087.01, 1123.01, 1128.00, 1131.01,
1187.00, 1188.00, 1189.00, 1965.00, 1135.00, 1138.01, 1141.00, 1143.00, 1145.01,
1146.00, 1147.00, 1193.00, 1164.00, 1181.01, 1186.02, and 1962.00.
Section 191.0315001 Qualified Opportunity Zone Business
“Qualified Opportunity Zone Business” means a trade or business, as defined in
Section 1400Z-2(d)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
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2. Cuyahoga County
a. Explanation of Legislation
Similarly, the Proposed Legislation for Cuyahoga County Council establishes
“Prioritized Opportunity Zones” and provides county benefits for QOZs that qualify
as pockets of poverty. In addition to directing county development funds into
Prioritized Opportunity Zones, these benefits include priority for abandoned building
demolitions, priority for the County’s job training program, priority for road
improvements, and an exemption from the three-year residency requirement for
businesses to qualify for preferences under the Cuyahoga County Based Business
(CCBB) Preference Program.

b. Proposed Legislation
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ENACTED BY THE COUNTY COUNCIL OF
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO:
SECTION 1. Chapter 709 of the Cuyahoga County Code is hereby amended to
read as follows (additions are underlined, deletions are stricken):
Chapter 709: Community Development Fund
Section 709.03 Use for Opportunity Zone Development
As of July 1, 2020 and through June 30, 2022, the revenues contained in the
Community Development Fund shall be used to promote economic development in
the Prioritized Opportunity Zones, hereby defined as the following census tracts:
1033.00, 1078.02, 1039.00, 1041.00, 1046.00, 1049.00, 1087.01, 1123.01, 1128.00,
1131.01, 1187.00, 1188.00, 1189.00, 1965.00, 1135.00, 1138.01, 1141.00, 1143.00,
1145.01, 1146.00, 1147.00, 1193.00, 1164.00, 1181.01, 1186.02, and 1962.00.
SECTION 2. Chapter Section 807 of the Cuyahoga County Code is hereby
amended to read as follows (additions are underlined, deletions are stricken):
Section 807.03 Property Demolition Program
B. The Department of Development, in consultation with the Land Bank, shall
establish eligibility criteria to evaluate applications received in each round of the
program. The eligibility criteria shall be established to evaluate the following factors,
exclusively:
1. Whether the applicant has sufficiently identified a target area, neighborhood
typological priorities, spot demolition site(s), or prioritized Opportunity Zone
containing a demonstrable need for demolition;
2. Whether the structures identified by the applicant for demolition have been
certified as vacant, abandoned, and nuisance or blighted;
3. Whether the applicant has identified a plan for redevelopment or maintenance
of the property or properties;
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4. Whether the applicant has sufficient capacity to administer the demolition, or
intends to engage an agent such as the Land Bank to administer demolition on its
behalf;
5. Whether the applicant has committed and is able to exercise the necessary
police powers or has identified alternative legal authority to enable demolition of the
identified structure or structures; and
6. Whether the actions proposed in the application are designed to assist in
carrying out a plan developed by the applicant to improve housing quality or
strengthen the housing market in the applicant’s municipality.
SECTION 3. Chapter 804 of the Cuyahoga County Code is hereby amended to
read as follows (additions are underlined, deletions are stricken):
Section 804.01 Post Secondary Educational Programs
B. Component One-Job Training/Retraining Program
2. Component One scholarships are open to all Cuyahoga County residents who
satisfy one of the following criteria:
a. They enroll in a degree or certification program in a field designated as "in
demand" by the City of Cleveland/Cuyahoga County Workforce Investment Board; or
b. They enroll in a degree or certification program in a non-demand field that has
a commitment from an employer to hire or promote; or
c. They are within twelve (12) credit hours from completing an associate, bachelor,
or master degree in any field at an approved postsecondary institution; or
d. They enroll in a class to satisfy continuing educational credit obligations
associated with professional licensing; or
e. They reside in a Prioritized Opportunity Zone, as defined in Section 709.03.
SECTION 4. Chapter 604 of the Cuyahoga County Code is hereby amended to
read as follows (additions are underlined, deletions are stricken):
Section 604.01 Improvement and Maintenance of County Roads
C. The Director of Public Works shall establish a process by which fiscally
distressed municipalities may apply for a grant to subsidize the cost of labor and
materials required to perform routine maintenance of County roadways. The
Department of Public Works shall qualify eligible applicants in order of priority based
on the following factors:
1. The availability of County resources;
2. The condition of the individual County roadway and assessed need for routine
maintenance;
3. The location of a County roadway within a Prioritized Opportunity Zone, as
defined in Section 709.03; and
4. The severity of fiscal distress of the applicant municipalities, as declared by the
Auditor of State.
SECTION 5. Chapter 502 of the Cuyahoga County Code is hereby amended to
read as follows (additions are underlined, deletions are stricken):
Section 502.01 Program
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There is hereby created a Cuyahoga County Based Business (CCBB) Preference
Program.
Section 502.02 Definitions
For purposes of Chapter 502 of the Cuyahoga County Code, a Cuyahoga County
Based Business means:
an individual, domestic corporation, sole proprietorship, partnership, or joint
venture whose principal place of business is located within a Prioritized Opportunity
Zone or otherwise has been located in Cuyahoga County for at least three (3) years as
registered in official documents filed with the Secretary of State of Ohio or the
Cuyahoga County Fiscal Office. If one party to a joint venture has its principal place
of business in Cuyahoga County, the joint venture shall be considered as having its
principal place of business in Cuyahoga County;

V. CONCLUSION
In the coming years, Opportunity Zones will be put to the test. Will they achieve
Congress’s intention of reducing concentrated poverty? Or will they simply become
another tax break for wealthy investors? The answer depends on how local
governments respond. On their own, Opportunity Zones will not achieve much. But,
with local supplements, their potential is endless. The key to successful local
supplements will be (1) limiting the number of qualified tracts, (2) tailoring public
expenditures toward services and infrastructure in the tracts, (3) simplifying taxation
and regulation, and (4) promoting citizen engagement. By enacting legislation with
these features, local governments have the power to finally break the cycle of
concentrated poverty that continues to devastate communities like Cleveland’s
Glenville neighborhood.
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